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Summary 
The right to primary education has been subject to regulation in both 
international human rights law and EU law. However, the right to education 
in the host state for EU migrants who lawfully exercise their freedom of 
movement, for a maximum of three months, is unclear. The aim of this 
study is to investigate whether such a right exists in this particular 
circumstance.  
 
EU legislation explicitly provides a right to education for children of 
workers but for other categories, such as self-employed people, job seekers 
or persons who do not fit into any of these categories, there does not exist 
any explicit right to education. The study investigates two openings that EU 
law provides to enjoy a right to education; through the parent’s status as a 
worker or through the equal treatment provision. If it is not possible for a 
person to fulfil the criteria for being a worker the possibility of finding a 
right to education enshrined in the equal treatment provision in the EU 
Citizenship Directive has to be investigated. This study concludes that 
education is not part of social assistance, which is the only possibility to 
derogate from equal treatment during the first three months of residence in 
the host state. The equal treatment could therefore possibly include a right to 
education regardless of length of stay in the host state. 
 
Due to the uncertainty of an explicit right to education in EU law for all 
persons regardless of economic status, international human rights law is 
examined in order to see how it regulates the right. International human 
rights law do provide for the right to education and even though 
international treaties are signed by states and only in some case by the EU, 
EU legislation should be interpreted in the light of EU’s Charter on 
Fundamental Rights (CFR) which in its turn should be interpreted in the 
light of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The European 
Court of Human Rights, along with other international bodies, has 
established that the right to education is of such fundamental character that 
derogations are almost impossible. 
 
In light of the outlined the right to education is contextualised for a 
particular group of Roma EU-migrants who are coming to Sweden and are 
begging, collecting cans or selling street papers in order to survive and to be 
able to send money to their families. The question of whether this particular 
group can be considered workers is investigated. It turns out that it is 
problematic to consider begging fulfilling the requirements for work settled 
in EU law. Hence, children to parents in this group of persons, along with 
all other EU-migrant children who do not have working parents, are left 
without any explicit right to education in EU-law.  
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This study concludes, after an overall assessment of the relevant 
frameworks that coexist, that a right to education for children who exercise 
their freedom of movement for a maximum of three months does exist in the 
host state. This is due to the reference in the CFR to the ECHR taken 
together with the strong position the right to education has been given in 
international human rights law and EU’s reliance upon international 
frameworks. 
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Sammanfattning 
Rätten till grundskola har blivit föremål för reglering i internationella 
instrument rörande mänskliga rättigheter såväl som i EU-lagstiftning. För de 
EU-migranter som lagligt utnyttjar sin rätt till fri rörlighet i maximalt tre 
månader är existensen av rätten till utbildning i den mottagande 
medlemsstaten dock oklart och syftet med den här studien är att undersöka 
huruvida en sådan rätt finns i den här specifika situationen.  
 
EU-rätten medger uttryckligen en rätt till utbildning till barn vars föräldrar 
är arbetare, men för andra kategorier såsom egenföretagare, jobbsökande 
eller personer som inte passar in i någon av de nämnda kategorierna, så 
finns det ingen uttrycklig rätt till utbildning. Studien undersöker de två 
möjligheter som ges inom EU-lagstiftningen för en rätt till utbildning; 
genom förälderns status som arbetare eller genom principen om 
likabehandling. Om det inte är möjligt för en person att uppfylla kriterierna 
för att anses vara en arbetare så får rätten till utbildning sökas genom ett 
studera principen om likabehandling i rörlighetsdirektivet. Den här studien 
drar slutsatsen att utbildning inte är en del av socialt bistånd, vilket är den 
enda möjligheten att inskränka principen om likabehandling under de tre 
första månaderna i den mottagande medlemsstaten. Principen om 
likabehandling kan därför möjligen inkludera en rätt till utbildning oavsett 
längden på vistelsen i den mottagande staten. 
 
På grund av osäkerheten huruvida en uttrycklig rätt till utbildning finns, 
oavsett ekonomisk status, i EU-rätten så undersöks internationella 
instrument rörande mänskliga rättigheter i syfte att se hur rätten till 
utbildning är reglerad där. De internationella instrumenten rörande 
mänskliga rättigheter ger uttryck för en rätt till utbildning och även om 
internationella instrument är ratificerade av stater och inte av EU, så ska 
EU-rätten tolkas i ljuset av EUs stadga om de grundläggande rättigheterna 
som i sin tur ska tolkas i ljuset av Europeiska konventionen om skydd för de 
mänskliga rättigheterna (EKMR). Europadomstolen har, liksom flera 
kommentarer till de internationella instrumenten, klargjort att rätten till 
utbildning är av en sådan fundamental karaktär att den i princip är omöjlig 
att inskränka. 
 
I ljuset av det som framförts så kontextualiseras rätten till utbildning genom 
att se på ett konkret exempel av en särskild grupp EU-migranter av romskt 
ursprung som kommer till Sverige och tvingas tigga för att överleva och 
skicka pengar till sina familjer. Frågan huruvida den här särskilda gruppen 
kan anses vara arbetare undersöks. Det visar sig problematiskt att anse att 
tiggeri uppfyller kraven för arbete enligt EU-rätten. Därför är barn till 
föräldrar i den här särskilda gruppen, tillsammans med alla andra EU-
migrerande barn som inte har arbetande föräldrar, lämnade utan någon 
uttrycklig rätt till utbildning enligt EU-rätten. 
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Den här studien drar slutsatsen, efter en helhetsbedömning av de relevanta 
ramverk som samexisterar, att en rätt till utbildning för barn som utnyttjar 
sin rätt till fri rörlighet i maximalt tre månader existerar i den mottagande 
medlemsstaten. Detta på grund av referensen i EUs stadga om de 
grundläggande friheterna till EKMR, sammantaget med den starka position 
som rätten till utbildning har getts i internationella instrument rörande 
mänskliga rättigheter och EUs tillit till dessa. 
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1 Introduction  
Starting from a right for workers1, the right to free movement within the 
European Union (EU) has successively expanded its personal scope to 
include all citizens within the European Union, regardless of income and 
financial possibilities. However, the free movement has been set under 
certain conditions when the stay in another EU member state exceeds three 
months or when there are justifiable restrictions based on public policy, 
public security or public health, to not permit entry and stay.2 The person 
needs to show that he or she either is engaged in an economic activity, 
studies, has enough financial resources to stay in the country or that he or 
she is a family member taken together with that he or she has health 
insurance.3 When persons exercise their right to freedom of movement and 
stay in the host country for a maximum of three months, certain limitations 
follow in regard to beneficiaries from the social assistance system. The host 
state does not have to provide financial aid in order to cover the living 
expenses of an EU-migrant, during the first three months; that would 
amount to an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system. 4,5 
 
It is in relation to which rights these EU-migrants, who exercise their 
freedom for a maximum of three months, are entitled to in the host state, the 
question arises which is the basis for this study. Is the host state responsible 
to provide education to those children who accompany their parents to 
another member state? The question has been given a lot of attention in 
Sweden during the last year due to a rise in EU-migrants with Roma6 
backgrounds that have come to Sweden and have found themselves in 
situations where they have to beg for money in order to survive. 7 These 
changing patterns in Sweden, and in other EU states, with an increase of 
Roma migrants, staying for a maximum of three months, but sometimes 
returning quickly for a new three months-period, have exposed the EU free 
movement law for a new situation, where temporary migrants are left with 
uncertainty about their legal rights. The Swedish National Agency for 
Education (Skolverket) has, in relation to the question whether those 
                                                
1 Boeles, P. (ed.), European migration law, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2009, p. 7-8, 52-53. 
2 See article 7 and 27 in Directive 2004/38/EC, EUT L 158, 30.4.2004, entered into force 
2004. 
3 See article 7 Directive 2004/38/EC Right of Union Citizens and their Family Members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158 of 30.4.2004. 
4 Boeles, P. (red.), op.cit., p. 7-8, 52-53. 
5 Rectial 10 and articles 6-7, 24 Directive 2004/38/EC. 
6 For the purpose of this study the Council of Europe definition of the term ”Roma” is used: 
The term “Roma” used at the Council of Europe refers to Roma, Sinti, Kale and related 
groups in Europe, including Travellers and the Eastern groups (Dom and Lom), and covers 
the wide diversity of the groups concerned, including persons who identify themselves as 
Gypsies, Council of Europe, Council of Europe Descriptive Glossary of terms Relating to 
Roma Issues, (2012), p. 4. 
7 See for instance: TT/Göteborgs Posten, EU-migranter kommunernas ansvar, 26 October 
2014 http://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.2528973--eu-migranter-kommuners-ansvar-  
Accessed:2015-05-11. 
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children who accompany their parents for a maximum of three months are 
entitled to education, expressed that there is no legal basis in national or EU 
law that points in either direction whether these children are entitled to 
education in the host state or not, and this fact constitutes a problem.8, 9 
 
In light of the new migration patterns that have been seen in EU over the 
last year this thesis will provide an overview of the legal frameworks that 
regulate the right to free movement and the right to education for EU-
migrants residing in the host state for a maximum of three months each 
time. In order to do so both EU legislation and international conventions 
will be engaged with. To be able to grasp the problem and the actual 
implications and questions that arise, the right to education for this 
particular group of EU-migrants will be examined through the lenses of 
Roma EU-migrants in Sweden. 
 
The choice of the topic is based on its currency in media and reality. When 
the EU decides to have a more open approach to border and immigration 
control, the mobility increases. With this development in the society also 
follows questions of the actual functionality of the EU system in relation to 
fundamental human rights obligations. Hopefully, this thesis will bring 
some clarity to how these legal frameworks are interpreted and how they 
function in actual situations when the right to education is invoked in an EU 
context.  
 
1.1 Research Question and Purpose 
The research question has been formulated as:  
 
Do children, who are citizens of one EU member state, have a right to 
education in a host member state when they exercise their freedom of 
movement within the European Union for a maximum of three months? 
 
In order to answer this question certain sub-questions are to be answered: 
• How are work, self-employment and job-seeking defined under EU 
law and what requirements have to be fulfilled to qualify to a certain 
group? 
• Does the equal treatment provision in EU law establish a right to 
education regardless of the length of stay in the host state? 
• Is there an absolute right to education regardless of citizenship and 
length of stay in the host state? 
 
The choice of research question is based on the explicit uncertainty in regard 
to this particular situation that has been raised by the Swedish National 
                                                
8 Kurkiala Medbo, Tova, Sveriges Radio, Svårt med skola för barn till EU-migranter, 21st 
October 2014. http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=114&artikel=5996267. 
Accessed: 2015-05-11. 
9 See supplement 2 for email communication between Skolverket and the author. 
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Agency for Education in Sweden. The need for the question to be further 
explored is evident and it is also important since the uncertainty affects a lot 
of people who are exercising their freedom of movement under these 
circumstances. To not know what rights one’s children are entitled to during 
a stay in another EU member state is severe and it causes impediments to 
the freedom of movement which is considered to be a right for all EU 
citizens. There is a need to explore this legal uncertainty in order to be able 
to clarify the legal entitlements for this group of EU-migrants. The problem 
deals with the question if equal treatment and human rights are entitlements 
secured to all EU child citizens, regardless of the temporary stay and the 
parents’ economic activity. 
 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the right to education for children, 
certain terms relating to work, as well as the concept of work itself, will be 
analysed. This is necessary in order to be able to define under which 
circumstances the right to education is entitled to children whose parents are 
workers. The right to education is somewhat interconnected with the 
parents’ economic status as will be shown later in the study.  
 
1.2 Methodology and Material 
In this thesis a traditional legal methodology will be used in order to identify 
the relevant material for the analysis that will be given in the conclusive part 
of this study. The base of a traditional legal method, i.e. a legal dogmatic 
method is, to analyse a legal problem through the study of different sources 
of law in accordance with the hierarchy of norms.10 A legal dogmatic 
analysis consists of an interpretation of how the studied legal rule should be 
interpreted in a given situation.11 It is important to determine what the legal 
problem actually is and what legal questions that arise from that specific 
situation. 12 Another aspect that forms a part of the legal dogmatic method is 
the possibility to go beyond a mere representation of the legal position of 
the problem and extend the study to a critical analysis. It is through the 
critical analysis, the legal doctrine, of a legal problem in a certain situation 
that the law develops and certain interpretations become valid.13 Lastly, 
when one applies a legal dogmatic methodology it is important to 
differentiate between an argumentation that is de lege lata, a description of 
how the legal position is, and an argumentation de lege ferenda, how the 
law ought to be.14 This thesis will primarily use an argumentation de lege 
lata. 
 
The reason to use a traditional legal method in this study is that the research 
question needs to be sub-divided to be able to identify the legal frameworks 
                                                
10 Kleineman, Jan in Korling, Fredric & Zamboni, Mauro (red.), Juridisk metodlära, 1. ed., 
Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2013, p. 21. 
11 Ibid, p. 26. 
12 Ibid, p. 30. 
13 Ibid, p. 35. 
14 Ibid, p. 36. 
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that co-exist. In order to understand the legal implications of the 
frameworks that relate to the legal issue at hand one has to study the 
relevant sources. Since the research question addresses a particular situation 
when the right to education is questioned this method is useful since it 
clarifies the different legal systems that regulate the research question. 
Moreover, it is a useful method when there exists a legal uncertainty, as is 
the case in this study, since it enables a critical analysis of the concern and 
also provides two grounds upon which the right to education can be 
established. 
 
Since a major part of this thesis engages in EU law and jurisprudence 
stemming from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the methodology that 
the ECJ uses is of relevance for how the facts and reasoning in this thesis 
are presented. A lot has been written in academic articles and books about 
the interpretation by the ECJ and it is relevant to grasp the methodology of 
the ECJ in order to further analyse the research question presented in this 
thesis. The rules of interpretation of the ECJ are not clearly manifested in 
any document and hence the method of legal reasoning in the ECJ does not 
constitute any specific European theory of legal reasoning.15 However, there 
is to some extent coherence in the interpretation of rules that the ECJ 
follows, even though they are not explicitly laid down in any document. The 
rules of interpretation are confirmed by the legal doctrine that has described 
them, and in turn the legal doctrine becomes a form of reference due to its 
influence and value amongst the practioners.16 
 
The ECJ has in the Cilfit case17 tried to distinguish which criteria that 
national courts should apply when they are assessing whether they need to 
make a reference to CJEU for a preliminary ruling. Bengoetxea, 
MacCormick and Moral Soriano18 have further elaborated and classified the 
criteria in three different groups: Linguistic (semiotic) criteria, systemic 
(contextual) criteria and dynamic criteria. In short the first criteria, the 
linguistic one, means that the literal wording is the one that should 
determine the interpretation. If the wording is clear, then there is no 
possibility to interpret something beyond the literal wording. 19, 20 The 
ordinary meaning of a word can differ and in the context of the EU, where 
several official languages are applicable, this can cause problem. The ECJ 
has solved it by using the interpretation that is most in conformity with all 
versions except one.21 
 
                                                
15 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon, MacCormick, Neil and Moral Soriano, Leonor, Intergration 
and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, in De Búrca, 
Gráinne & Weiler, Joseph (eds.), The European Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001, p. 48. 
16 Itzcovich, Giulio, The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of 
Justice, German Law Journal, Vol.10, No.5, 2009, p. 540. 
17 C-281/83 Cilfit v. Ministry of Health, 1982 . 
18 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon, MacCormick, Neil and Moral Soriano, Leonor, op.cit,, p. 48. 
19 Itzcovich, Giulio, op.cit., p.549-550.  
20 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon, MacCormick, Neil and Moral Soriano, Leonor, op.cit,, p. 58. 
21 Itzcovich, Giulio, op.cit. p.551. 
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The systemic criterion means that the rule should be interpreted within the 
system of rules that it belongs to. The Court has to look at similar principles, 
rules and concepts in order to determine the content of the rule. Methods 
commonly used for a systemic interpretation are: a fortiori, analogy, a 
contrario, a pari, ad absurdum.22 The last criterion, the dynamic, is the one 
that is mostly used by the ECJ and it is commonly considered that ECJ is a 
court with a teleological method of interpretation. In the dynamic criterion 
three sub-categories can be crystallized: functional, teleological or 
consequentialist interpretation. The functional interpretation has strong 
connections to the effet utile (useful effect).23 It means that a rule or a 
principle should be interpreted in a way that enables its effectiveness and in 
a way in which it becomes most useful. The teleological approach is the 
way in which the object and purpose of a provision is analysed. It can be 
either an implicit or an explicit purpose, but the Court “has to justify the 
interpretation from the perspective of its instrumental function in relation to 
such goals and purposes”24. The last form of interpretation is the 
consequentialist interpretation which aims at interpreting a rule by 
anticipating which consequences the rule can get. The different forms of 
interpretation in the dynamic criteria are often mixed and it is not always a 
clear-cut division between them.25 
 
The methodology used by the ECJ can be further expanded upon, but for the 
purpose and limits of a study like this, the given methodology will be 
sufficient in order to understand the ECJ’s reasoning that will be presented 
in this thesis as well the analysis of the research question. The legal 
methodology that the ECJ uses will also be of relevance when analysing the 
material that will be presented in the thesis and how it should be interpreted. 
The understanding of the methodology is crucial for how an answer on EU-
related issues, such as the one at hand, is sought, identified and interpreted. 
 
The materials that have been used in this study stems from different sources 
such as EU legislation and correlating doctrine, i.e. textbooks and academic 
articles. Furthermore, from the doctrine and academic articles available, 
international and regional human rights instruments are reviewed and 
analysed. Jurisprudence from EU, international courts, such as the European 
Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) are scrutinized to identify relevant legal 
findings.  Relevant legislation from the EU on free movement for persons, 
workers and self-employed has been reviewed. The case law that has been 
focused on is the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decisions in relation to 
the concept of work and what the definition of economic activity entails. 
This has been done in order to crystalize relevant criteria for determining a 
parent’s status within EU law and, as an extension, define the child’s 
possibility to access education. Moreover, an examination and a comparison 
have been made of the international and regional conventions that regulate 
the right to education and the rights of the child. This has been made in 
                                                
22 Bengoetxea, Joxerramon, MacCormick, Neil and Moral Soriano, Leonor ,op.cit. , p. 58. 
23 Itzcovich, Giulio, op.cit.,p. 555. 
24 Ibid., p. 555. 
25 Ibid, p. 552-555. 
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order to be able to analyse the legal obligations of the states that arise in the 
particular situation that this study aims to investigate. 
 
Legal doctrine, i.e. articles and textbooks, has been engaged in to get 
explanatory and critical views of the existing law. Furthermore, news media 
and reports from the FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights) have been examined to gather information about the situation in 
Sweden for Roma EU-migrants as well as how the situation for Roma is in 
Europe today. Based on the collected material and legal review, a 
conclusion of what the study has found will be presented and the result of 
the study of the research question will be analysed. 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
The thesis has been delimited due to the space and time limit that exists for 
a master’s thesis. Firstly, this study focuses on the right to primary 
education and not secondary or university education. The importance of 
education and its impact on the individual will not be deliberated upon in 
this thesis. Only the mere existence of the right to education in legal 
frameworks regulating the particular situation at hand will be analysed. 
Furthermore, the study has been limited to focus only on the first three 
months of the period when an EU citizen exercises his or her freedom of 
movement. The reason for the limitation to the initial period of three months 
is that it is an interesting period to analyse, since there are no formal 
requirements that have to be fulfilled in order to enter another member state, 
except holding a valid passport of one of the EU member states. To study 
which rights and obligations that might be invoked during this specific 
period of time is interesting in relation to how EU law and international 
conventions interact. The focus is on the host states’ obligations to provide 
education and the extra-territorial obligations that might exist for the 
sending state will not be further investigated. Moreover, the study does not 
include an analysis of the right to education for third country nationals 
(TCN) who accompany an EU-citizen to another member state. 
 
The limit has also been drawn in relation to the national example given. The 
example of Roma EU-migrants is not the only example of persons in this 
particular group of EU-migrants. However, it is an illustrative example that 
also is based on a current debate in Europe and in Sweden. Moreover, it is 
important to stress in relation to Roma that the example given concerns 
Roma who are begging, collecting cans for recycling purposes or selling 
street papers. However, it is not assumed that all Roma who are exercising 
their freedom of movement for a maximum of three months take part in the 
aforementioned economic activities.  
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1.4 Definitions 
This thesis uses the term EU-migrant. The concept of EU-migrant, and what 
that definition actually includes, is not settled in any EU-document or any 
other official document. In news media, the term is often used referring to 
persons who exercise their freedom of movement because of poverty in their 
home country or due to homelessness. For the purpose of this thesis, it is 
important to highlight that the term EU-migration is used for describing all 
kind of movements of EU citizens between EU member states, regardless of 
economic activity and purpose of the movement. Hence, the term EU-
migrant is not restricted to any particular group of persons within the EU.26, 
27 
 
1.5 Disposition 
This thesis is divided into four main substantive parts forming equally many 
chapters. Chapter two focuses on EU law on free movement of persons. A 
historical background will introduce the concept of EU citizenship and the 
development of the right to free movement. It is important to know the 
incentives behind EU legislation in order to understand the structure of it 
today. An overview of the legal provisions regarding free movement will 
provide the reader with the relevant legislation concerning the situation. The 
chapter on EU free movement will conclude with two different views and an 
analysis on how the right to education is potentially established in EU 
legislation; through the explicit reference to the parent as a worker or 
through the equal treatment provision. Case law is used in order to gain an 
adequate perception of the meaning of the notions and its relevance for the 
right to education. The conclusion in this chapter is that workers’ children 
are entitled to education in the host state, from the first day, whence the 
possibility that finding a right to education under the equal treatment 
provision may be established. 
 
The third chapter engages in the right to education as a human right 
enshrined in international conventions and regional instruments. The 
purpose of this chapter is to see how the right to education is formulated in 
different conventions and what legal implications that follows from the 
different conventions. Moreover, the state responsibility and obligations of 
the right to education is analysed in order to trace the content and meaning 
of the right and which states that are responsible for ensuring the right to 
                                                
26 See for instance a news media article highlighting the problematic definition: Ramel, 
Fredrik; Szoppe, Adam, EU-migrant ett problematiskt begrepp, 
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=3993&artikel=5915740 accessed: 2015-
05-11. 
27 See also the definition of ”migrant” made by the European Commission at the EU 
Immigration Portal: ”A broader-term of an immigrant and emigrant that refers to a person 
who leaves from one country or region to settle in another, often in search of a better life”. 
http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/glossary_en accessed: 2015-05-11. 
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education in specific circumstances. The conclusion in this chapter is that 
the right to education is present in both EU law and international law and it 
is a right that has an absolute character. 
 
The fourth chapter moves from the general analysis that has been made in 
the two previous chapters, applicable to all EU-migrants exercising their 
freedom of movement for a maximum of three months, to contextualise the 
problem within the setting of Roma EU-migrants in Sweden and their access 
to education. This will provide the reader with an illustrative example that 
makes the research question more concrete and it will demonstrate how the 
legal uncertainty comes into play in a national context. The main focus is on 
which economic activities, such as begging, can be classified as work within 
the meaning it has been given in EU law. The conclusion is that although 
their flexible interpretation, the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order 
to be considered a worker, are not clearly satisfied for beggars, but the door 
is not closed for an extensive interpretation.  
 
The fifth chapter is analysing the substantive contents of the previous 
chapters and an answer to the main research question is deliberated upon. 
The analysis presents a possible way of reasoning, in accordance with the 
methodology applicable in this study, which generates an answer that 
reflects the view of the author based on the overall assessment of the legal 
frameworks available. Moreover, the fifth chapter contains some 
considerations for the future which have been become evident through the 
writing of the thesis. 
 
Lastly, a concluding chapter will summarize the conclusions that have been 
made throughout the study. 
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2 A Right to Education Under 
European Union Law 
This section will provide an overview of the legal framework that regulates 
the situation of EU-migrants exercising their right to free movement and 
their access to education. The EU law will be contextualised in the specific 
situation of persons exercising their right to freedom of movement for a 
maximum of three months and the question whether their children enjoy a 
right to education from an EU law perspective. First, an overview of the 
legal framework, i.e. EU citizenship, directives and regulations, relating to 
freedom of movement will be presented. Secondly, the concept of work will 
be studied from an EU perspective and this study will try to show what kind 
of activities can be regarded as work. As an effect the status of the parent as 
a worker or not will determine the children’s express right to education. 
Thirdly, the equal treatment provision will be analysed and if it entails a 
right to access to education. The equal treatment provision will also be dealt 
with in relation to social assistance and whether education can be regarded 
as falling within the concept of social assistance. The second part of this 
chapter is aiming at answering the question whether the right to education is 
established for this particular group of persons exercising their right to 
freedom of movement.  
 
2.1 European Union Free Movement Law 
2.1.1 Historical Background  
When one studies the free movement of persons in the European Union the 
importance of knowing the historical development of this right in the EU is 
essential in order to understand the purpose and underlying aim of the right 
to freedom of movement. To grasp the background and purpose of the 
establishment of the EU, and how the powers and possibilities have 
extended throughout the decades, is essential in order to interpret EU law as 
well. Free movement is one of the fundamental features of the EU taken 
together with the free movement of goods, capital and services.28 The right 
to move freely within the EU was however in reality not a freedom that all 
citizens within the EU were entitled to from the start of the organisation in 
the 1960s, unless they fulfilled certain criteria. The person had to be both a 
national of one of the member states and economically active as a worker in 
order to exercise the freedom of movement.29 The definition of worker has 
been thoroughly deliberated on in case law and it will be further elaborated 
                                                
28 Preamble (2) Directive 2004/38/EC 
29 Barnard, Catherine, The substantive law of the EU: the four freedoms, 4. ed., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 229. 
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on in chapter 2.2.1. The possibility to move freely was not available to those 
who did not have any work in the member state they intended to travel to.30 
 
Step by step the free movement of persons expanded in the 1960s to include 
persons who had sufficient resources and medical insurance, regardless of 
work activity. Gradually the tendency within the EU has been to recognize 
the individual as a citizen of the union, not only as a person being part of an 
economic equation. When the Maastricht Treaty31 was adopted in 1993 the 
citizenship of EU was introduced32 and persons were entitled to rights and 
duties without any requirement to be economically active in order to 
exercise their right to move freely within the union. Finally, in 2004 the 
Directive 2004/38/EC33 (The EU Citizenship Directive) came which 
brought together the scattered legislation that previously had been found in 
different documents. Today the common market, on which the EU once was 
built, is far from based on strict economic provisions for the free movement 
of persons, at least at a first glance. In particular the economic requirements 
are removed from the first three months of the stay in the host state as well 
as after five years of residence. In between, however, the person has to show 
that he or she has financial resources enough to stay and live in the country. 
This will be deliberated on more thoroughly below in chapter 2.1.4. 34 
 
2.1.2 Division of Competence 
 
EU has a widespread power in different areas in relation to its member 
states. However, the division of powers, or competence, between the union 
and the member states are different depending on the area concerned. It is 
therefore important to be aware of the division of competence in different 
areas in order to understand where the legislation is a EU concern, a national 
concern or a combination of the both. The EU competences are divided in 
exclusive, shared and supporting competences. Exclusive competences are 
regulated in article 3 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and in the areas that falls within this category, EU has the exclusive 
power to legislate and adopt legally binding acts. When EU and the member 
states have shared competence, article 4 TFEU, both parties have the power 
to legislate. Nonetheless, the member states have only the right to legislate 
in so far as EU has not already legislated in the area. Supporting 
competences, article 6 TFEU, implies that EU has non-legislative powers in 
those areas that are reserved for the member states. EU can only support, 
                                                
30 Barnard, Catherine, op.cit., p. 229. 
31 Also known as Treaty on the European Union, entered into force 1993, OJ C 191 of 
29.7.1992. 
32 Article B (Common provisions), article 8a-8d (part two) Treaty on the European Union 
(Maastricht), entered into force 1993, OJ C 191 of 29.7.1992. 
33 Directive 2004/38/EC Right of Union Citizens and their Family Members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158 of 30.4.2004. 
34 Barnard, Catherine, op.cit., p.229-231. 
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complement or coordinate the member states in those areas.35 For the 
purpose of this thesis it is interesting to know in which areas of competence 
the freedom of movement and education are placed. Freedom of movement 
is an area in which EU has shared competences with the member states.36 
The legislation on free movement will be presented in this chapter. 
Educational matters belong to the supporting competences and the member 
states have the main responsibility to legislate.37 The right to education will 
be further developed in chapter 3.    
 
2.1.3 European Union Citizenship 
EU citizenship is primarily regulated in the Lisbon Treaty38. Article 20 
(TFEU) describes the meaning of European Union citizenship and it is 
further developed in article 21-25 TFEU based on the list found in article 
20.2 (a-d) TFEU. Article 21-23 deals with the right to free movement and 
residence within the EU (article 21 TFEU), the right to vote and stand in 
elections (article 22 TFEU) and diplomatic and consular protection (article 
23 TFEU).39 
 
Union citizenship is dependent on the person having a national citizenship 
in one of the member states from which the Union citizenship follows 
automatically. Although the EU citizenship at a first glance can be seen as a 
product of the European Union, it is still the member states that decide their 
rules for a person to get a national citizenship, and these rules can differ 
between the member states.40 In reality, the Union citizenship is very much 
dependent on the member states’ own national legislations and a substantial 
part of the decision power remains in the member states. 41 
 
With EU citizenship also follows rights and duties laid down in the treaties. 
The most relevant right is the right to move and reside freely in another 
member state, which will be elaborated on more thoroughly in section 2.1.4. 
What initially has been doubtful about EU citizenship is if the provision in 
article 20 TFEU actually added anything new to the already existing 
legislation. Throughout the years the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a 
number of decisions has clarified the significance of the EU citizenship. The 
rights for economically active citizens have been radically extended since 
the beginning of the European Union to include also those who move and 
                                                
35 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, EU law: text, cases, and materials, 5. ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 78-86. 
36 Article 4 TFEU. 
37 Article 6(e) TFEU. 
38 The Lisbon Treaty includes The Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty (TEU) on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as well as several Protocols and 
Declarations attached to the Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 and it 
amended previous treaties (the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome). 
39 Condinanzi, Massimo., Lang, Alessandra & Nascimbene, Bruno, Citizenship of the 
Union and free movement of persons, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2008, p. 4-7 
40 Article 20(1) TFEU. 
41 Condinanzi, Massimo., Lang, Alessandra & Nascimbene, Bruno, op.cit., p.4-7. 
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reside not solely for working and economic purpose. The restrictions that a 
state may impose on this category of Union citizens have to be 
proportionate and their status as Union citizens must be recognized. 42, 43 Of 
relevance when one is exercising one’s Union citizenship is that 
discrimination on grounds of nationality is forbidden according to article 18 
TFEU. 
 
The notion of Union citizenship has not been left without critique. It is a 
diverse critique that attacks different parts of the concept and problematizes 
its usefulness. One of the main critiques has been that the actual benefits of 
a Union citizenship, compared to the possession of solely a national 
citizenship, is unclear and possibly non-existent, at least when it concerns 
particular vulnerable groups such as women and ethnic minorities.44 One of 
the main critiques, which is of relevance for this study, is the fact that the 
Union citizenship, and thereby the lawful residence in the host country, is 
built on the premise that the person contributes to the economic system in 
the host country and not becomes an unreasonable burden to its welfare 
system. This way of connecting the person’s usefulness for the host country 
to the permission to access benefits from the welfare system is far from 
what citizenship means within the context of a national citizenship.45 These 
economic and market-based underpinnings to the Union Citizenship also 
indirectly lead to disadvantages for certain groups, such as women, which 
traditionally, and still reflected in today’s society, have been more involved 
in work at home including taking care of children. Women are less likely to 
be able to enjoy the benefits of a Union citizenship based on the structures 
that the society still upholds.46 
 
                                                
42 See C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2002) 
confirmed in C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2004). 
43 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, op.cit, p. 823-829. 
44 Bellamy R (2008) Evaluating Union citizenship: Belonging, rights and participation 
within the EU. Citizenship Studies 12(6): 597–611; Kochenov D (2009) Ius tractum of 
many faces: European citizenship and the difficult relationship between status and rights. 
Columbia Journal of European Law 15(2): 169–237; Maas W (2008) Migrants, states, and 
EU citizenship’s unfulfilled promise. Citizenship Studies 12(6): 583–596; cited in Askola, 
Heli,”Tale of Two Citizenships? Citizenship, Migration and Care in the European Union”, 
Social & Legal Studies 21(3) (2012), p. 344. 
45 Ibid., p. 344. 
46 Ackers L (1994) Women, citizenship and European Community law: The gender 
implications of the free movement provisions. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 
16(4): 391–406. Ackers L (1996) Citizenship, gender, and dependence in the European 
Union: Women and internal migration. Social Politics 3(2–3): 316–330. Ackers L (1998) 
Shifting Spaces: Women, Citizenship and Migration within the European Union. Bristol: 
Policy Press.; Flynn L (1996) The internal market and the European Union: Some feminist 
notes. In: Bottomley A (ed.) Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law. 
London: Cavendish, pp. 279–297.; Scheiwe K (1994) EC law’s unequal treatment of the 
family: The case law of the European Court of Justice on rules prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of sex and nationality. Social and Legal Studies 3(2): 243–265; cited in Askola, 
Heli, ”Tale of Two Citizenships? Citizenship, Migration and Care in the European Union”, 
Social & Legal Studies 21(3) (2012), p. 344. 
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The definition of work, which will be much more deliberated on in chapter 
2.2.1, is also linked to the gender discussion in such way that generally 
unpaid work, such as taking care of children, is not considered to be “work” 
in EU law. Then the significance of the caretaker is recognized and the 
person (primarily a woman) enjoys the benefits of being a citizen of the 
union. 47 These norms that underpin EU law and the Union Citizenship 
show that it is still a market based concept and that the gender inequalities 
remain indirectly. This critique is of course based on feministic views and it 
highlights that there are values and norms that are prevailing in EU law 
system and these and other values possibly effect other vulnerable groups 
such as Roma and children. These aspects of EU Citizenship will be more 
thoroughly discussed in chapter 4. 
 
Another critique that is based more on the right of the state is that the EU 
infringes on the state sovereignty and one of its fundamental principles to be 
able to control the entry and residence of aliens within its territory. By 
allowing freedom of movement and not laying down any certain conditions 
for the first three months certainly infringes on the state sovereignty in this 
matter. However, the economic requirement that applies after three months 
enables the individual state to control the migration flow to a certain 
extent.48 
 
2.1.4 Free Movement of Persons and the 
2004/38/EC Directive 
The relevant provisions for the free movement of persons are found in the 
Lisbon Treaty. Article 21 TFEU lays down the right to free movement 
within the union that is further enlarged on in the EU Citizenship Directive 
49,50 .  
 
The EU Citizenship Directive was adopted in order to consolidate and 
amend the already existing legislation on the right to free movement. The 
purpose was to collect the different directives that dealt with workers, self-
employed, students and inactive persons in one single instrument.51 
 
Roughly, one can say that the EU Citizenship Directive lays down the 
conditions under which EU citizens can exercise their right to freedom of 
movement within the EU. The rights of a person to freedom of movement 
                                                
47 For comparison see ECJ case law: C-85/96 Maria Martinez Sala v Freeistat Bayern 
(1998) and C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2002) 
confirmed in C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2004). 
48 Askola, Heli, Tale of Two Citizenships? Citizenship, Migration and Care in the 
European Union, Social & Legal Studies 21(3) (2012), p. 343. 
49 Directive 2004/38/EC, EUT L 158, 30.4.2004, entered into force 2004. 
50 ”A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.”, Article 288 TFEU. 
51 Recital 3 in the preamble to 2004/38/EC. 
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within the EU also extend to his or her family members, i.e. children and 
spouses, even though the rules for the free movement distinguish between 
family members with a Union citizenship and third country nationals. 52 
 
For the purpose of this thesis the focus will be on the initial right to 
residence for persons in the host member state. The relevant parts of the 
articles in the EU Citizenship Directive will be cited below: 
 
Article 6 
 
Right of residence for up to three months 
 
1. Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of 
another Member State for a period of up to three months without any 
conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a 
valid identity card or passport. 
 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall also apply to family members in 
possession of a valid passport who are not nationals of a Member 
State, accompanying or joining the Union citizen. 
 
Article 7 
 
Right of residence for more than three months 
 
1. All Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of 
another Member State for a period of longer than three months if 
they: 
 
(a) are workers or self-employed persons in the host Member State; or 
 
(b) have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members 
not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during their period of residence and have 
comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State; 
or 
 
(c)  
– are enrolled at a private or public establishment, accredited or 
financed by the host Member State on the basis of its legislation or 
administrative practice, for the principal purpose of following a 
course of study, including vocational training; and 
 
– have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member 
State and assure the relevant national authority, by means of a 
declaration or by such equivalent means as they may choose, that 
they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family 
                                                
52 Article 1 2004/38/EC. Regarding third country nationals different provisions can be 
found in the EU Citizenship Directive, see for example articles 5(2), 7(2) and  9. 
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members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of 
the host Member State during their period of residence; or 
 
(d) are family members accompanying or joining a Union citizen who 
satisfies the conditions referred to in points (a), (b) or (c). 
 
When applying the EU Citizenship Directive one first has to see whether the 
personal, material and territorial scope of application are fulfilled in the 
situation concerned. In order for the personal scope to be fulfilled the 
individual must be a national of a member state of the EU. Furthermore, the 
person must fit within any of the categories: worker, self-employed, service-
provider, job-seeker or tourist. The determination of a person’s status is 
dependent on whether the person is economically active or not. In order for 
the material and territorial scope to be fulfilled the person has to move 
between two states, which normally is between the home state and to the 
host state. 53,54 
 
Secondly, one has to distinguish between if the situation concerns a stay of 
less or more than three months. As stated in article 6 of the EU Citizenship 
Directive there are no requirements, except having a valid identity card or 
passport and fulfil the personal, material and territorial scope, that the EU 
citizen has to fulfil in order to enjoy free movement and residence in another 
member state the initial three months. However, after three months article 
7.1 (a)-(d) comes into play and the economic requirement is activated unless 
he or she is a family member to someone on whom he or she can depend 
economically.  
 
In relation to this study the status of children in the EU Citizenship 
Directive is important to clarify. Firstly, one can notice that if the child has 
the nationality of one of the EU member states, then he or she is regarded as 
a Union citizen within the meaning of article 2(1) of the EU Citizenship 
Directive. However, it is most likely that the child accompanies one or both 
of his or her parents to the host country and then the child is also covered by 
being a “family member” within the meaning of article 2(2)(c) EU 
Citizenship Directive, a status which a descendant can have up to he or she 
turns 21 years old. The reason to highlight the children’s position is 
important, but it also shows that there exists a relationship of dependency 
between the Union citizen and the family members, in this case the children, 
who accompany the parent. The possession of rights and access to social 
benefits are dependent on the person who exercises its Union citizenship 
and the person’s fulfilment of the requirements laid down in the EU 
Citizenship Directive. 
 
Equal treatment is one of the cornerstones within the EU55 and in the EU 
Citizenship Directive article 24 is reaffirming this principle: 
  
                                                
53 Article 2 Directive 2004/38/EC. 
54 Barnard, Catherine, op.cit., p. 231-234. 
55 Articles 18-19 TFEU. 
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Article 24 
 
Equal treatment 
 
1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in 
the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the 
basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall 
enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within 
the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to 
family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who 
have the right of residence or permanent residence. 
 
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the host Member State shall 
not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the 
first three months of residence or, where appropriate, the longer 
period provided for in Article 14(4)(b), nor shall it be obliged, prior 
to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, to grant 
maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training, consisting 
in student grants or student loans to persons other than workers, self-
employed persons, persons who retain such status and members of 
their families. 
 
What can be deduced from the equal treatment article is that whilst the first 
paragraph sets out the general standard for equal treatment to those who 
exercise their freedom of movement, the second paragraph entitles states to 
derogate from the general equal treatment provision. This derogation allows 
states to “escape” from their entitlement to provide social assistance to those 
who stay for a maximum of three months and not are economically active as 
well as for those who are job seekers. This can be seen as one way of 
preventing what some of the critical voices against a more open EU, have 
called “benefit-tourism”. 56  The equal treatment and the social assistance in 
relation to the right to education will be deliberated more on in chapter 
2.2.2.  
 
2.1.5 Regulation no 492/2011 on Freedom of 
Movement for Workers within the Union 
Regulation57 no 492/201158 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
union replaces the previous Regulation 1612/6859 regarding the same issues. 
                                                
56 Verschueren, Herwig, Free movement or benefit tourism: the unreasonable burden of 
Brey, European Journal of Migration and Law (16), 2014, p. 149.  
57 ”A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States”, article 288 TFEU. 
58 Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the union, OJ L 141, 
27.5.2011. 
59 Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of workers within the Community Series I Volume 
1968(II) p. 475 – 484. 
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However, due to several amendments over time there was a reason for 
codification that gives an overall picture of the present legislation in the 
area. The reason to deal with this regulation is that it concerns workers and 
their families, i.e. children. The Regulation 492/2011 applies simultaneously 
as the EU Citizenship Directive, however, there are provisions which apply 
only to workers and they are laid down specifically in regulation 492/2011 
concerning among other things equal treatment, clearances of vacancies and 
applications for employment and workers’ families.  
 
What is remarkable with the Regulation 492/2011, in comparison to the EU 
Citizenship Directive, is that there is a provision in article 10 of Regulation 
492/2011 that establishes a right to education for children who accompany a 
working parent to another member state.  
 
Workers’ families 
Article 10 
 
The children of a national of a Member State who is or has been 
employed in the territory of another Member State shall be admitted 
to that State’s general educational, apprenticeship and vocational 
training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that 
State, if such children are residing in its territory.  
 
Member States shall encourage all efforts to enable such children to 
attend these courses under the best possible conditions.  
 
This provision is based on the fact that non-discrimination is the prevailing 
norm between nationals and Union citizens of another member state. 
Conclusively, one can say that if the parent is considered a worker within 
the meaning of EU law, then the children are entitled to education in the 
host state without any explicit requirement of minimum time of residence in 
the host state. It seems as workers and their families are, due to the specific 
provisions in the Regulation 492/2011, entitled to more rights than those 
who do not perform an economic activity regarded as work. 
 
The right to education in relation to workers has been dealt with in the 
Baumbast case 60 that also extended the scope of the right to education for 
migrants. This case is reflected upon not because it applies to the persons 
that exercise their freedom of movement for a maximum of three months, 
but because it reflects the general view of ECJ in relation to the right to 
education in the host state. The case raised four questions before the ECJ, 
but the one which is of relevance for the right to education was whether the 
children who were citizens of the EU and had installed themselves in 
primary education in the host state, based on the father’s status as a worker, 
had the right to continue their education despite the fact that the father no 
longer worked in the host country. The question was raised in relation to 
regulation 1612/68 (today in Regulation 492/2011) concerning the freedom 
                                                
60 C-413/99 Baumbast R v The Secretary of the State for the Home Department (2002).  
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of movement of workers and especially in relation to article 1261 in that 
legislation. The ECJ found that regardless of whether the working parent 
ceases to work, or that only one of the parents is a citizen of the EU, or that 
the parents divorce in the meantime, the right to education for the children 
should not be affected.62 
 
Even though the regulation for migrating children can be seen as relatively 
exhaustive compared to other rights protected in EU law, loopholes do 
occur due to the classification of persons in different categories in which 
they can benefit from the social welfare system. The Baumbast case shows 
one of the loopholes where the ECJ deemed that article 12 in the 1612/68 
Regulation (today article 10 in the Regulation 492/2011) should be 
interpreted broadly. If the children were refused to continue their education 
in the host state there would be a disruption in the integration process and it 
would also create obstacles to the free movement of workers if the children 
were refused to continue an education that had already been started.63 
However, the right to education in the Baumbast case was based on a 
previously lawful residence as a worker in the host country that 
differentiates it from cases where EU-migrants stay for a maximum of three 
months and do not classify as workers. Nevertheless, the case illustrates the 
views of the ECJ that a wide interpretation should be given and that the 
integration process is an important element. 
 
The definition of worker will be deliberated more upon in chapter 2.2.1 
concerning the ECJ case law on the definition of work. Moreover, the 
definition of worker will be returned to in the chapter 4 on the situation of 
Roma EU-migrants in Sweden. It is interesting in relation to the question 
whether begging can be seen as an economic activity generating the same 
rights that workers are entitled to and as an extension of that, the question 
arises if Roma EU-migrants’ children are entitled to education if they are 
staying for a maximum of three months at a time in the host state.  
 
2.1.6 European Union Law on Self-employment  
The EU has made a special category for those who are not considered to be 
workers but who instead are self-employed persons. This category needs, 
within the context of EU legislation, special regulation. The question that is 
relevant for this study is what legal entitlements follow from the status as a 
self-employed person and especially whether there exists any reference to 
                                                
61 Article 12 in Dir. EC/1612/68: ”The children of a national of a Member State who is or 
has been employed in the territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State's 
general educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same 
conditions as the nationals of that State, if such children are residing in its territory. 
Member States shall encourage all efforts to enable such children to attend these courses 
under the best possible conditions.” 
62 C-413/99 Baumbast R v The Secretary of the State for the Home Department (2002) 
para. 39-63. 
63 Ibid. para. 46, 51-52. 
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the right to education for the children who accompany their parents to 
another member state for a limited period of time. 
 
The right to establishment and the right to provide services are treated in 
separate sections in the EU legislation even though there are similarities. 
The central provisions are found in articles 49-55 TFEU (freedom of 
establishment) and articles 56-62 TFEU (freedom to provide services) 
which have been supplemented by secondary legislation in the form of 
directives.  
 
Whilst the freedom of establishment presumes either a primary 
establishment (the individual leaves state A in order to set up an 
establishment in state B) or a secondary establishment (the person has an 
establishment in state A but sets up second base in state B) on a permanent 
basis, the freedom to provide services presumes that there is an 
establishment in one member state and either the provider or the recipient of 
the service temporarily engages in the service in another member state. 64 
The temporal element is a necessity in order for the economic activity to be 
regarded as a service and not an establishment. The determination and 
content of temporal is however not necessarily connected to the 
infrastructure (or the lack of) that the service requires. The fact that the 
service needs for example an office is not in itself an evidence of it being an 
establishment.65  
 
Self-employed persons have similarities with posted workers, even though 
the two categories are differently treated in EU law.66 Situations do occur 
when a self-employed person from one member state (the posting state) 
leaves and starts working in another member state (the state of 
employment). Questions arise in relation to which rules that apply in the 
situation and concerning the self-employed person – the posting state’s laws 
or the state of employment’s laws? When it concerns self-employed persons 
who temporarily work in another member state EU law provides special 
regulation due to the obstacles and confusion it would create for the persons 
exercising this right if they had to figure out which state’s laws that are 
applicable. A general rule is found in article 12(2) of Regulation 883/200467 
which states that the posting state’s laws and regulations are applicable as 
long as the activity carried out is similar to the one that the person carried 
out in the posting state and that the stay in the state of employment does not 
exceed 24 months. This criterion presumes that the person already in the 
posting state has an establishment, otherwise the person is not qualified as a 
self-employed person within the meaning of the regulation. When 
determining whether a person can be categorized as a self-employed person 
two criteria are of relevance. Firstly, the person has to have pursued the 
                                                
64 Barnard, Catherine, op.cit., p. 306-308, 365-366. 
65 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, op.cit., p. 764-767, 788-790. 
66 The Posting of Workers Directive 96/71/EC and article 49 TFEU on the right of 
establishment for self-employed. 
67 Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, EUT L 314, 
7.6.2004. 
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activity for some time (two months has been accepted) in the posting state 
before leaving to another member state.  Secondly, the person has to fulfil 
the necessary requirements for pursuing an activity in the posting state and 
that the establishment, and the means which enables the activity to be 
carried out, remain in the posting state for his or her return. When assessing 
if a person fulfils the criteria above one can for example see whether the 
person pays taxes in the posting state, has an office there or maintain a 
VAT-number there. These are only examples of ways to check if the person 
can be labelled as self-employed and they are not obligatory or exhaustive 
ways for the determination.68 
 
Conclusively, if a person is self-employed the legislation of the posting state 
applies for a person the initial period of two years, i.e. for the purpose of 
this study the first three months, which means that the social security system 
of the posting state is the crucial one. What implications does it have on the 
right to education for a child who is accompanying his or her self-employed 
parent? The only thing that is determined is that if the person, i.e. the parent, 
is possible to classify as a temporarily self-employed, it does not change the 
applicable laws regarding social security issues, it remains with the posting 
state. However, the definition of social security is important in order to 
know if it applies to access to education. In regulation 883/2004 article 3 
dictates which matters that are covered and education is not specifically 
identified. The only possible parallel to education is family benefits (article 
3(1)(j) regulation 883/2004). Family benefits are moreover defined in article 
1(z) Regulation 883/2004 as “all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet 
family expenses, excluding advances of maintenance payments and special 
childbirth and adoption allowances mentioned in Annex I.” Education is 
possibly not included as a family benefit in the social security system. The 
question then remains – which state is responsible for a self-employed 
person’s child and that child’s right to education if it is not regarded as 
falling within the social security system? 
 
Apparently, a linguistic method of interpretation does not provide a 
satisfactory answer to the question on the status for self-employed persons’ 
children’s right to education. As mentioned earlier the ECJ often adopts a 
teleological approach in its judgements, an approach that was adopted in the 
Carpenter case69. The case concerned a TCN who married a national from 
the United Kingdom. The TCN, a Philippine woman, overstayed her lawful 
time of residence before she married the man from the United Kingdom. 
The man worked as a self-employed and had to travel to other member 
states of the EU in order to run his business. United Kingdom issued a 
deportation order of the woman but she appealed against the decision, 
stating that she had the right to stay under Community law and a deportation 
order would infringe on the husband’s possibility to work as a self-
employed, travelling to other member states, since she was the one who 
                                                
68 European Commission, Practical guide: The legislation that applies to workers in the 
European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA) and in Switzerland, 2012, p. 
12-13. 
69 C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2002). 
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took care of the children meanwhile he was working.70 
 
The ECJ acknowledges the importance of enable the freedom of movement 
for workers, self-employed and their family members. The Court finds that a 
separation between the spouses would cause an infringement on the 
fundamental rights of the husband laid down under Community law. This 
freedom could not be fully effective if Mr Carpenter was hindered to move 
freely as a self-employed as a consequence of his wife’s deportation from 
the UK where she otherwise took care of his children.71 
 
What the Carpenter case illustrates is that workers and self-employed are 
seen as important contributors to the internal market, fulfilling the economic 
purposes constituting the fundamental values of the EU. It also shows that 
an extensive interpretation should be given in cases where the right of self-
employed persons are at stake. This judgment is a good proof of the 
teleological approach and it shows a possible way of ensuring rights to self-
employed persons that sometimes are more far-fetched than the right 
relevant for this study – the right to education. Perhaps the possibility to 
enjoy a right to education for children to self-employed persons can be 
protected with a teleological interpretation, based on previous case law in 
favour of self-employed persons, such as the Carpenter case. Such 
interpretation might ensure a right to education to children who have one or 
two parents working abroad, for example as an IT- consultant, but then there 
still is a large group left without protection: job-seekers, tourists or persons 
who due to any other reason are exercising their freedom of movement. 
What interpretation, if any, can give them a right to education? The next 
sub-sections will explore further possibilities. 
 
2.1.7 European Union Law and the Status of 
Job Seekers  
The EU free movement provisions include a group that are neither workers 
or self-employed persons, nor tourists, namely job seekers. This category 
within the EU law system holds an interim position between being a person 
exercising its right to freedom of movement and a worker doing the same. 
The particular position in which job seekers are also creates special 
regulation. The debate has been whether, and how far, job seekers should be 
included in article 45 TFEU, laying down the free movement principles of 
workers.72  
 
The answer is sought in the different EU instruments as well as the case law. 
Article 45 TFEU has been interpreted widely by the ECJ and there is no 
requirement that the person has to have a job offer before entering the host 
                                                
70 C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2002), para. 13-
17. 
71 Ibid, para. 38-39. 
72 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, op.cit, p. 726-728. 
 28 
state. That would be contrary and counterproductive to the aim of the free 
movement itself. Certain provisions tend to give a less restrictive treatment 
to job seekers, such as in recital 21 to the EU Citizenship Directive, where it 
is stated that the ECJ can give a more favourable treatment to job seekers 
than to those who are not engaged in any economic activity, or do not 
attempt to be involved in any work. This indicates, and has been confirmed 
in case law, that job seekers might stay for longer period of time than three 
months without any specific requirements since it is reasonable to get more 
than three months to search for a job. However the exact time for how long 
a job seeker can stay under these more favourable conditions is not yet 
established. In the Antoinissen case73 the ECJ held that allowing a six-
month period of job seeking seemed reasonable by a state, but if the person 
gives evidence that he or she is continuing seeking job after six months the 
state is not allowed to expel the person. The interpretation of ECJ regarding 
the time limit is somewhat flexible.74, 75 
 
Nevertheless, job seekers do not obtain the status of worker, and the rights 
stemming from the possession of that status, since they do not contribute to 
the economic system in the same way as a worker. Regulation 492/2011 
(and its predecessor Regulation 1612/68) which specifies the rights for 
workers and their freedom of movement has been dealt upon by the ECJ in 
relation to what privileges that a job seeker can be entitled to. In Collins76 
the distinction was made between job seekers and workers in relation to the 
social advantages and equality of treatment with nationals and the ECJ held 
that job seekers could not take advantage of the same rights as workers. The 
only provision that is applicable to job seekers on the same level as workers 
is regarding access to employment and equal treatment to the access.77 Even 
though job seekers are entitled to more benefits than those who only can 
stay for a maximum of three months78 their family and children are not 
entitled to the same social advantages as workers’ children.79 
 
2.2 Two Ways to Establish the Right to 
Education under European Union Law  
The purpose of this sub-chapter is two-folded. Firstly it aims at investigating 
the definition of work and worker within the EU case law and what limits 
that have been established through the jurisprudence. The aim is to show 
which economic activities fall within the concept and what persons who are 
exercising their freedom of movement for a maximum of three months can 
                                                
73 C-292/89 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Antoinissen (1991). 
74 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, op.cit., p. 726-728, 745-746. 
75 See reasoning in C-292/89 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p Antoinissen (1991), in 
relation to the length of a justifiable job seeking period, para. 21. 
76 C-138/02 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (2004) confirmed in C-
258/04 Office National de l’emploi v Ioannidis (2005). 
77 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, op.cit., 8, 745-746. 
78 Recital 21 to Directive 2004/38/EC. 
79 Job-seekers are not included in article 10 Regulation 492/2011. 
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expect to be labelled as. To be qualified as a worker is the only way that EU 
law expressly provides for education to the accompanying children as has 
been shown by the previous presentation of the existing EU legal 
framework.80 Secondly, this subchapter seeks an answer to the question on 
if there exists a right to education for those children staying in the host state 
for a maximum of three months, regardless of economic activity, through 
the provision of equal treatment. In relation to the equal treatment 
discussion the concept of social assistance will be further investigated since 
it plays a crucial role for whether the persons who are a maximum of three 
months in the host state, and do not fulfil the work criteria, have access to 
education or not.   
 
2.2.1 European Court of Justice and its Case 
Law on the Definition of Work 
This section will focus on how case law from the ECJ has defined work and 
what restrictions it might entail and if the EU definition of work possibly 
can encompass other forms of economic activities that typically fall outside 
the definition of work. The right for workers to freely move within the 
Union is laid down in article 45-46 TFEU (article 49 TFEU if the person is 
self-employed) where it is also stated that secondary legislation (such as the 
EU Citizenship Directive and Regulation 492/2011) should be made in 
order to provide more detailed provisions concerning the freedom of 
movement of workers. The right to freely move between the member states 
for workers has existed for a long time due to the economic and market 
based impacts these kinds of activities have on the union. The right for 
workers has existed long before the right existed for every citizen of the 
union to move freely. Since this area is one of the most fundamental for the 
EU, the case law has been extensive and the concept of work and worker 
has slowly been more crystalized than in its initial phase. The cases that will 
be mentioned below are all involved in establishing borders, or non-borders, 
for the concept of worker.   
 
Firstly, the ECJ has in one of its earlier cases Hoekstra81 expressed that 
national law is not to decide upon the meaning and content of the concept of 
worker, it is EU law which lays down the definition.82 It is stated that the 
concept of worker has to be interpreted broadly and that the concept has a 
specific meaning within the context of EU law. 83  
 
                                                
80 In article 10 Regulation 492/2011. See sub-section 2.1.4 for a more comprehensive 
overview. 
81 C75/63 Hoekstra v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten 
(1964) ECR 177. 
82 Ibid, p. 184. 
83 C-138/02 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (2004) para. 26. 
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In the Trojani84 opinion from 2004 the Advocate General85 identifies four 
conditions that should be satisfied in order for a person to qualify as a 
worker. The first three conditions are to be fulfilled cumulatively. The last 
criterion is relevant for the overall assessment. The conditions are:  
 
• the activity must last for a certain period, 86 
• there must be a relationship of subordination, 87 
• the person carrying out the activities must be remunerated and,88 
• there must be real and genuine economic activity89 
 
These conditions, which have been evolved through ECJ’s case law, will be 
deliberated upon in detail below. The first criterion was laid down in the 
Levin90 case and Meeusen91 case where the court established that the activity 
carried out must be effective and genuine and not be marginal or ancillary in 
order to fulfil the criteria that it should last for a certain period. 92 There is 
however no requirement of a certain time that the employment must exist to 
fulfil the first criteria. In order to determine whether a work is qualified as 
effective and genuine the national court has to conduct a comprehensive 
assessment of all circumstances that relate to the activity and the 
employment relationship and base it on objective criteria.93   
 
The second criterion can be seen as self-explanatory, however there are 
situations in which the relationship between the employee and the employer 
is not framed in what is normally considered to be an employment-
relationship. A good example can be found in the Steymann94 case that 
concerned a man with German citizenship who worked as a plumber, but 
moved to the Netherlands where he also initially worked as a plumber, but 
soon after his arrival got involved in the religious Bhagwan Community. In 
                                                
84 Opinion of the Advocate General Geelhoed in the case C-456/02 Michel Trojani v Centre 
public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) (2004). 
85 The role of the Advocate General:”It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting 
with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions 
on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, require his involvement.” Article 252 TFEU. “Where it considers that the case 
raises no new point of law, the Court may decide, after hearing the Advocate-General, that 
the case shall be determined without a submission from the Advocate General.” Article 20 
in Protocol (no 3) On the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The 
opinion of the Advocate General is not binding for the ECJ and thereby the opinion does 
not establish any binding perception of EU laws. 
86 Opinion of the Advocate General Geelhoed in the case C-456/02 Michel Trojani v Centre 
public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) (2004), para. 35. The three conditions are laid 
down in C-66/85 Lawrie-Blum (1986), paragraph 17, C-3444/87 Bettray (1989), paragraph 
12, and C-337/97 Meeusen (1999), paragraph 13. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid, para. 45. 
90 C-53/81 D.M. Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1982). 
91 C-337/97 C.P.M Meeusen v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep. 
92 C-53/81 D.M. Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1982), para. 17. 
93 Confirmed in C-456/02 Michel Trojani v Centre Public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles 
(CPAS) (2004) para 17. 
94 C196/87 Udo Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1988), para. 14. 
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the Baghwan Community Steymann worked with the community’s 
commercial activities. The Bhagwan community enabled its existence by 
running different forms of commercial activities, which included running a 
discotheque, a bar and a laundrette. Regardless of the activity the member 
carried out, the Bhagwan community provided its members with all material 
needs they might have.95 The ECJ concluded that a community, based on 
religion or any philosophy, which carries out commercial activities to its 
members, that indirectly can be perceived as genuine and effective work, 
will constitute work within the meaning it has in EU law.96 In this case the 
subordination, and the relationship between the employer and the employee, 
was somehow not ordinary and not subordinate in character, nonetheless the 
ECJ has regarded this as adequate work since it had an indirect quid pro quo 
aspect.97 Remarkably is, as pointed out by the Advocate General in the 
Trojani case, that the ECJ does not comment on whether Steymann was 
under subordination, such as obliged to do “specific jobs to be specified by 
the community”.  98   
 
The third criterion concerns the remuneration and it has been deliberated 
upon in several cases. The Levin case will serve as ground for the 
explanation in this case. The Levin case concerned a woman of British 
nationality who moved to the Netherlands with her husband from a third 
country. In the Netherlands the woman engaged in small part-time work and 
financed her living with investments. The question was whether the 
remuneration from the part-time job was enough in order to consider her to 
be a worker within the meaning it has in EU law. Noteworthy is that the 
income she got was way below what was considered as a minimum wage in 
the sector. The ECJ concluded that even though the work was only on part-
time this did not in itself preclude the woman the right to freedom of 
movement as a worker. Furthermore, the fact that the income was below the 
necessary amount for living in the state did not directly mean that it was 
impossible to live in the state. Other incomes, such as the woman’s 
investments, enabled her living and the right to the status of worker should 
not be decided upon productivity or the amount of remuneration.99 
 
The fourth and last criterion that the Advocate General highlights in order to 
be considered a worker is that it should be a real and genuine economic 
activity. This criterion is linked to the content of the work performed and 
parallels can be drawn to other case law from ECJ, which stated in the 
Bettray100 case, that work that has a merely rehabilitative or reintegrative 
character, adapted to the physical and mental state of the person concerned, 
is not considered work.101 The Advocate General in the Trojani case 
                                                
95 C196/87 Udo Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1988),, para. 3-4. 
96 Ibid, para. 14. 
97 Ibid, para. 12. 
98 Opinion of the Advocate General Geelhoed in the case C-456/02 Michel Trojani v Centre 
public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) (2004) para. 44. 
99 C-53/81 D.M. Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1982), para.16. 
100 C- 344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1989). 
101 C- 344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1989), para. 17 confirmed in C-456/02 
Michel Trojani v Centre Public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) (2004) para 18. 
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furthermore emphasised the fact that in that case the person did not apply 
for any job and the “employer” did not base the employment on any 
personal skills or requirement of the “worker”. This was however not 
considered in the final judgment in the Trojani case.102 
 
Several aspects should be noted in relation to the criteria laid out above. 
Firstly, they are a summary of the case law concerning the concept of 
worker done by the General Advocate in the Trojani case and in some 
aspects the ECJ has differed in its final judgments. However, it is a good 
summary of the present views of the concept of worker, but every case 
should be decided on the specific circumstances that are at hand in the 
specific situation. Nevertheless, the criteria elaborated upon above are 
generally considered in cases where the ECJ has to determine whether a 
person can be classified as a worker as has been shown in the cases 
elaborated upon above. 
 
2.2.2 Equal Treatment and Social Assistance 
This section investigates the equal treatment provision in EU law and 
whether that provision establishes a right to education regardless of the 
status of the child’s parent in EU law. The purpose of this sub-chapter is to 
answer the sub-question to the main research question: Does the equal 
treatment provision in EU law establish a right to education regardless of 
the length of stay in the host state? In order to analyse the equal treatment 
provision this section will also consider the definition of social assistance 
and social advantages and whether the terms include the access to education.  
 
As presented in chapter 2.1.3 the equal treatment provision is one of the 
cornerstones in EU. The provision is laid down in article 2-3 TEU and 
articles 8 and 10 TFEU as a general base and then it is enshrined in article 
24 of the EU Citizenship Directive as mentioned in a sub-section 2.1.4. In 
the context of free movement for a period of maximum three months a 
derogation clause is included in article 24(2) of the EU Citizenship 
Directive as explained earlier in this study. This derogation leaves it up to 
the host state to decide whether it should grant social assistance to a person 
for the first three months. Job seekers can be excluded from the benefit of 
social assistance as long as they retain that status even though they are 
lawfully residing in the host state. That depends, as noted before, on 
whether the host state decides to grant social assistance or not. 103 In recital 
10 to the EU Citizenship Directive it is stated that persons “should not 
become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system during an 
initial period of three months“104. This is to protect states from benefit-
tourism, where people come in order to take advantage of the social welfare 
system in another state. 
                                                
102 Opinion of the Advocate General Geelhoed in the case C-456/02 Michel Trojani v 
Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) (2004), para. 53. 
103 Recital 21 Directive 2004/38/EC. 
104 Recital 10, Directive 2004/38/EC. 
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For the purpose of this study it is important to determine what social 
assistance means and whether or not the right to education is included in 
that term.  In the Brey case105 the ECJ defined the term social assistance: 
“that concept must be interpreted as covering all assistance introduced by 
the public authorities, whether at national, regional or local level, that can 
be claimed by an individual who does not have resources sufficient to meet 
his own basic needs and the needs of his family and who, by reason of that 
fact, may become a burden on the public finances of the host Member State 
during his period of residence which could have consequences for the 
overall level of assistance which may be granted by that State”106.  
 
As a comparison to the notion of social assistance the term social 
advantages can be analysed. This term is used in the Regulation 492/2011, 
which is applicable to workers. Is there a difference between the two 
concepts? The social advantage concept is very broad and it has been 
interpreted to include as well financial as non-financial benefits. The term 
has gained a wide interpretation and includes social advantages that 
normally is not included in the concept such as a right to require that legal 
proceedings are carried out in a specific language and the possibility for the 
partner to a migrant worker, not yet married, to live together. 107 Both social 
assistance and social advantages are terms that generally are not defined at 
national level, which hence makes the EU definition, and the ECJ 
interpretation, the one that is used. 108 
 
Since there is a terminological difference between the concepts, but the lines 
are somewhat blurred, the focus will be on the term social assistance since it 
is the one that applies to people exercising their right to freedom of 
movement for a maximum of three months, regardless of status. Does 
education seem to be compatible with the definition laid down by the ECJ in 
the Brey case? The purpose of having a wide definition and not an 
exhaustive list of the term social assistance is of course that national 
differences and rephrasing of assistances would lead to states being able to 
escape from their responsibility to provide social assistance if such an 
exhaustive list is used. However, guidance can be sought in national 
definitions and specifications and for the purpose of this study the Swedish 
legislation will be used in order to reach an understanding of the term social 
assistance. In the Swedish transposition of the EU Citizenship Directive the 
term social assistance refers to actions that can be taken under the Social 
Services Act109. These actions mainly include financial assistance in the 
form of maintenance aid or assistance to life in general, which is compatible 
with the conclusions drawn in the Brey case. The social assistance is 
                                                
105 C-140/12 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v. Peter Brey, (2013). 
106 Ibid., para. 61. 
107 Aleksandra Czekaj-Dancewicz, Analytical note on social and tax advantages and 
benefits under EU law, European Report, 2013, p. 4. Accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=475&langId=en&moreDocuments=yes accessed: 
2015-05-11. 
108 Ibid, p. 6. 
109 Socialtjänstlagen SFS 2001:453. 
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provided in order to satisfy a certain standard of living and to empower the 
person to live an independent life. 110 Nevertheless, there is no explicit 
reference to the right to education in the Social Services Act, which 
reinforce the view that social assistance does not include the right to 
education.  
 
If then one can conclude that the right to education is beyond the scope of 
social assistance, then one also can determine that the exception in the 
derogation clause in article 24(2) EU Citizenship Directive does not apply to 
the right to education. Hence, the access to education in accordance with the 
principle of equal treatment is not dependent on the length of the stay in the 
host state for a person, regardless of status, that exercises its freedom of 
movement.  
 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided the reader with the relevant law concerning the 
freedom of movement within the EU. The purpose has been to determine 
whether EU law provides an answer to the question whether children are 
entitled to education when they exercise their right to freedom of movement 
for a maximum of three months. As has been confirmed, EU legislation 
distinguishes between persons depending on their position in the society and 
whether they are contributing to the economy and internal market, or if they 
are mere “tourists” exercising their freedom of movement for a maximum of 
three months. The only express reference to the right to education is found 
in regulation 492/2011 that gives worker’s children the right to education, 
regardless of length of stay in the host state. The possibility to move within 
the union as a self-employed person or a job-seeker has also been covered in 
order to evaluate whether the possession of such status would entitle the 
children to education. No such express possibilities have been found. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter has sought to investigate the concept of worker 
and what kind of activities the ECJ has considered as acceptable in order to 
qualify as work. Different conditions have been crystallized through an 
analysis of the ECJ’s case law. The conclusion is that the criteria laid down 
by the ECJ case law have to be fulfilled cumulatively, however there is 
scope for flexible interpretation. Children of self-employed persons might, 
with the methodology used by ECJ, enjoy a right to education through a 
teleological or consequentialist interpretation. Lastly, the equal treatment 
provision in EU law has been considered and whether it is possible for a 
host member state to derogate from the provision in relation to education. It 
is only on the equal treatment provision that persons who do not qualify in 
any of the other categories can rely on, if at all. Since EU law does not 
provide a fully satisfactory answer to the research question the next chapter 
will analyse the question from a human rights perspective. The right to 
education is a right within the international context. The implications from 
                                                
110 Socialtjänstlagen SFS 2001:453, Chapter 4, §1. 
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international human rights conventions as well as the EU framework for 
human rights will be covered in order to see what obligations that derive 
from these conventions. 
 36 
3 A Right to Education Under 
Human Rights Law  
The right to education has been enshrined in a number of different 
international and regional instruments that are binding on the state parties. 
This chapter will present the legal framework that exists regarding the right 
to education and also explain the implications of the right and what can be 
expected of states to provide when it comes to their obligation to fulfil the 
right to education. One analytical tool will be described, the “respect, 
protect, fulfil”-typology, in order to cover the legal implications that follow 
from the right to education. This chapter will investigate whether the 
research question can be answered with reference to international 
conventions and one of the analytical tools that is available. 
 
3.1 The Concept of the Right to Education 
and its Existence in International 
Conventions 
To define the right to education is not an easy task. What one realizes 
reading the different provisions in the treaties is that there is no universal 
concept of what the right to education actually is, a weakness that makes it 
easier for states to take this obligation less seriously.111 That the right to 
education should be classified as a fundamental right is an argument that is 
put forward in the international human rights arena and some of the 
arguments for it will be presented shortly in the following. Firstly, education 
can be seen as the fundamental way in which states preserve their culture 
and values, and pass it on to the next generation. Moreover, education is a 
necessary tool in order to engage and enjoy other rights of politic and civil 
nature. Education creates a certain degree of competence that is valuable in 
order to build the democratic structure in the society, with all its 
implications. Furthermore, the right to education is closely linked to the 
human dignity where education gives the human being the basic tools to 
think logically and gain self-respect. And in the extension of this the human 
being can have a personal development and realise its potential and function 
in a society. Lastly, the right to education has been recognised as a welfare 
right, meaning that if one is unable to provide for the right oneself, the 
community will give certain help to fulfil it. Other welfare rights are access 
to health care and food.112 
 
                                                
111 Spring, Joel, The universal right to education: justification, definition, and guidelines, 
Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, N.J., 2000, p.1, 4. 
112 Hodgson, Douglas, The human right to education, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1998, p. 17-
20. 
 37 
The first human rights document that still is applicable today, that included 
the right to education, is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) from 1948. In article 26 UDHR it is stated that: “Everyone has the 
right to education”. Since the adoption of the UDHR several international 
treaties have reaffirmed the right to education. For example in article 13-14 
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) adopted in 1966 it lays down “the right of everyone to 
education”113. Several commentaries114 to the rights enshrined in the 
ICESCR have been issued, but in relation to education General Comment 
13115 is relevant. The four A-scheme (availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and adaptability)116 assures the right to education on all levels. 
Interesting is that the right to education for migrants, refugees and asylum-
seekers have been confirmed by the Committee: “The principle of non-
discrimination extends to all persons of school age residing in the territory 
of a State party, including non-nationals, and irrespective of their legal 
status.”117 This statement is reaffirmed in other international instruments 
such as in article 3(e) of the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in 
Education as well as in article 30 of the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families. Nationality is therefore a discrimination ground that is non-
acceptable.118  
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)119 is another important 
instrument regulating the rights of the child and the right to education. CRC 
entails the right to education in article 28 CRC120 and it is clearly stated that 
                                                
113 Article 13(1) ICESCR.  
114 The legal status of General Comments have been debated. General Comments have been 
defined as: ”means by which a UN Human Rights Experts Committee distils its considered 
view on an issue which arises out of the provisions of the treaty whose implementation it 
supervises and presents those views in the context of a formal statement of its 
understanding to which it attaches major importance. In essence the aim is to spell out and 
make more accessible the ”jurisprudence” emerging from its work.” Alston, Philip, The 
Historical Origins of the Comcept of General Comments” in Human Rights law Review in 
L. Boisson de Chazournes and V. Gowland Debbas (ed.), The Inernational Legal System in 
Quest of Equity and Universality: Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab, The Hague Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2011, p. 775 fn 49. For more thourogh deliberation upon the legal status of General 
Comments see for instance: Keller, Helen; Ulfstein, Geir; Grover, Leena, UN Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy, Cambridge University Press 2012. 
115 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13, The right to 
education (Twenty-first session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999). 
116 This analytical tool was developed by the former Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education, Katarina Tomasevski. See for instance: Tomasevski, Katarina, Preliminary 
Report of the Special rapporteur on the Right to Education, submitted in accordance with 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/33, E/CN.4/1999/49, 1999 for a further 
elaboration on the concepts. 
117 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13, The right to 
education (Twenty-first session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999), para 34. 
118 Saul, Ben; Kinley, David; Mowbray, Jacqueline, The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultrual Righs. Commentary, Cases and Materials, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, p. 1124. 
119 The Convention on the Rights of the Child opened for signature in 1989 and entered into 
force 1990. 
120 Article 28(1) CRC: ”1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and 
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the state has to provide free and compulsory education to all children. This 
obligation is applicable to children who are below 18 years old.121 In the 
CRC the aims of education are laid down in article 29. This description of 
the aims is one of the most detailed that exists in international human rights 
instruments today. These aims intend to strengthen both the individual and 
his or her knowledge, but also gain the society by fostering fundamental 
values and morals on the individual.122  
 
Furthermore, the CRC has laid down the best interest of the child and 
determined that the principle should be a guidance: 
 
“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities 
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.”123 
 
The best interest of the child primarily focuses on the well-being of a child, 
but how that well-being is defined is dependent on many factors such as the 
age, the maturity of the child, the child’s environment and the presence or 
absence of his or her parents. 124 The emphasis on the interest of the child 
implies that it is a wide protection, since rights are based on some kind of 
interest. Interests include a wider spectrum of entitlements than rights. The 
consideration is also a definition with a broad ambit and it implies that 
when authorities have to make a decision involving children they have to 
not only note the fact that it concerns children, but actually take into account 
and give it weight in the final decision. 125 
 
The best interest of the child principle has been subject to critique because 
some regard it as vague and open for too much interpretation. Especially it 
has been noted that it is a principle that can be interpreted differently 
depending on the cultural context, which also might diminish the actual 
protection of the child. An example that can be given is in cases concerning 
female genital mutilation where the principle, depending on the cultural 
                                                                                                                        
with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they 
shall, in particular: a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; (b) 
Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general 
and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take 
appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial 
assistance in case of need; (c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of 
capacity by every appropriate means; (d) Make educational and vocational information 
and guidance available and accessible to all children; (e) Take measures to encourage 
regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates.” 
121 See article 1 CRC for the definition of a child. 
122 Hodgson, Douglas, op.cit., p. 75-83. 
123 See article 3 CRC for the definition of the principle the best interest of the child. The 
principle is repeated in different forms in article 9(1), 9(3), 18(1), 20(1), 21, 37(c), 
40(2)(b)(iii) CRC. 
124 UNHCR, Guideline on Determining the Best Interest of the Child (2008), p.14-15. 
125 McAdam, Jane, Complementary protection in international refugee law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007, p.177-179. 
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context in which the child is, might not be interpreted in the child’s favour. 
Nonetheless, the advocates for the usefulness of the principle argues that 
indeterminacy is a key feature of human rights principles in general and that 
CRC nevertheless lays down good standards and a minimum framework of 
ethic values.126 
 
An essential question in relation to the conventions is to whom the state is 
obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the rights enshrined in the conventions. 
“Everyone (has the right to education)”, everyone is a word that indicates 
that there are no limits of the states’ obligations. However, in some 
conventions a jurisdictional127 clause is incorporated, as for example in 
article 2 CRC. This means that the state party is obliged to respect and 
ensure the rights laid down in the convention “to each child within its 
jurisdiction, without discrimination of any kind…”128. A similar 
jurisdictional clause is not included in the ICSECR or the UDHR, which 
also invokes a greater responsibility outside a state’s own territory, where 
no territorial or jurisdictional borders are defined.129  
 
The state obligation to ensure the right to education is clearly defined in 
several international instruments. The division of responsibility for the 
fulfilment of the rights is however unclear but in relation to this study and in 
the context of the EU it is an interesting aspect that needs to be further 
engaged in when it comes to the relationship between EU law and 
international treaties for EU-migrants who exercise their freedom of 
movement for a maximum of three months.  
 
3.2 State Obligations – the Tripartite 
Typology 
When one analyses a state’s actions in relation to a right, especially a social, 
economic or cultural right, one can use analytical tools in order to see if the 
state adhere to the obligations that it has signed in international conventions. 
Two different analytical tools have emerged which have gained acceptance, 
however they are still debated. The “respect, protect and fulfil” tool was 
initially developed in relation to the right to food, but has afterwards been 
used to other rights. The 4-As scheme (availability, accessibility, adequacy 
and adaptability) was previously mostly used in relation to the right to 
                                                
126 McAdam, Jane, op.cit., p. 179. 
127 ”The term “jurisdiction” refers to the territory and people over which a state has 
factual control, power, or authority. It should not be confused with the limits imposed 
under international law on the ability of a state to exercise prescriptive (or legislative) and 
enforcement jurisdiction.” See:  De Schutter, Oliver et al, Commentary to the Maastricht 
Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Human Rights Quaterly 43, 2012, p. 1102.  
128 Article 2(1) CRC. 
129 Vandenhole, Wouter, Beyond Territoriality. The Maastricht Principles on Extra-
Territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 29 
Netherlands Quaterly of Human Rights, 2011, p. 430.  
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education but has also been used for analysing other rights.130 The next 
section will go through the respect, protect and fulfil tool since it has been 
used the most and it is also widely accepted as applicable to a wider range 
of human rights. The 4-As scheme is more about challenging the quality of 
the right as opposed to the actual right to have education in the first place. 
 
The tripartite typology evolved through Asbjorn Eide’s work as Rapporteur 
for the UN and in his report “The Right to Food as a Human Right”131 he 
initially described four different obligations: an obligation to respect, an 
obligation to protect, an obligation to ensure and an obligation to promote. 
Later these four obligations were narrowed down to the tripartite typology. 
Henry Shue, who amended the typology a bit by introducing the element of 
the state’s obligation to promote, has further deliberated upon the typology. 
Shue also concluded that for every right there are three types of duties. The 
three duties must all be satisfied and recognized in order for the right to be 
fulfilled. However it is not necessary that the same institution fulfil all 
duties as long as all levels of duties are fulfilled at the same time. 132  
 
The application and usage of the analytical framework has been proven 
useful for both judicial and quasi-judicial bodies when examining social, 
economic and cultural rights and state’s compliance with the rights. How 
the tripartite typology works in practice and what the different notions mean 
is of relevance for understanding international rights laid down in 
conventions. In an elaboration of his analytical framework, Eide in 1999 
further explained the different obligations. The level of respect aims at the 
state’s duty to respect the resources, freedoms, autonomy and liberty of 
action by the individual. It is an obligation where the state should refrain 
from infringing on the enjoyment of the right. Nonetheless, there might be 
third parties that infringe on the fundamental right and the state then has a 
duty to protect the individual from the third parties infringement. This 
aspect of the obligation to protect has been seen as the most important one 
for the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The protection can 
be given in forms of legislative measures and effective remedies that are 
accessible to the individuals. The duty to protect and the duty to fulfil are 
both correlated to the duty to promote, which includes for example 
promoting tolerance and raising awareness. Lastly, the obligation to fulfil 
includes the actual realization of the right to all individuals. Special 
attention should be given to those who have difficulties in accessing the 
social, economic and cultural rights such as persons with disabilities, 
children or elderly persons. 133, 134 
                                                
130 Schutter, Olivier de, International human rights law: cases, materials, commentary, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 241- 242. 
131 Eide, Asbjorn, The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/25, 
1983. 
132 Schutter, Olivier de, op.cit., p. 242-243. 
133 Eide, Asbjorn, The Right to Adequate Food and to be Free from Hunger, Updated Study 
on the Right to Food, submitted by Asbjorn Eide in accordance with Sub-Commision 
decision 1998/06 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999, 1999, para 52, cited in Schutter, Olivier de, 
International human rights law: cases, materials, commentary, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2010, p.245-246. 
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Critiques have been put forward to the tripartite typology and its 
functioning. The critique has merely focused on the justiciability of these 
rights. 135 Nevertheless, the typology has functioned and been applied by a 
lot of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and for the purpose of this thesis the 
existing critique will be left out since it does not contribute to the analysis of 
the research question in this study.  
 
The purpose of demonstrating the tripartite typology, in addition to the 
positive and negative obligations regime that exists, is to embrace a more 
multifaceted view on the right to education and the obligations that are 
imposed on states. The analytical tool also shows more clearly what the 
right to education entails and what states are responsible for providing. 
Some of the conventions have jurisdictional and territorial clauses that 
indicate that the right to education should be ensured to anyone within the 
borders of a state. For those instruments that do not have such jurisdictional 
clause, how far goes the responsibility for the host states, does it include a 
right to education for those who exercise their freedom of movement for a 
maximum of three months in the EU? As has been expressed in the 
Commentaries to the ICESCR there exists a right for non-nationals to 
education, but the migration context in which the commentaries are done is 
different from the EU free movement migration for three months. However, 
there seems to be a right for migrants and asylum-seekers to enjoy the right 
to education in the host state due to the fact that they are under that state’s 
jurisdiction. One can ask oneself if, in the context of temporal movement 
within the EU, the state responsibility is less rigid? Is it the host state, whose 
immigration control is almost non-existent for this particular group, or the 
home state due to an extra-territorial obligation, that should ensure the right 
to education for the EU-citizens? That question, about extra-territorial state 
responsibility, is relevant, but the purpose of this thesis is only to investigate 
the host state’s responsibility.  
 
3.3 The European Union, Human Rights 
and Children 
This section will elaborate on the relationship between the EU and human 
rights. As has been thoroughly deliberated on in the historical overview of 
the EU in chapter 2.1.1 the union was initially founded on purely 
economical and market-based grounds.136 The agenda was not to be a 
                                                                                                                        
134 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, The Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 
155/96 (2001), para. 44-48. Cited in Schutter, Olivier de, International human rights law: 
cases, materials, commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 246-247. 
135 For more reading on the critique of the tripartite typology see for example: Ida Elisabeth 
Koch, Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?, Human Rights Law Review, 5, 
No.1 (2005), p. 81-103 and Ida Elisabeth Koch, The Justiciability of Indivisible Rights, 
Nordic Journal of International Law, 72, No. 1, 2003, p.3-39. 
136 Barnard, Catherine, op.cit., p.229-231. 
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human rights organization, however through the expansion and its 
development the EU has been obliged to affirm its position in human rights 
concerns regarding its member states and its citizens. The frameworks for 
human rights in Europe can be found in different forms of treaties, 
stemming from different institutions, which makes it more complicated for 
the individual to have an overview and to know which one of the 
instruments that is most appropriate to trigger in the situation concerned. 137 
 
The EU has throughout its history recognized human rights as fundamental 
and as “general principles of law”138. Primarily, general principles of law 
refer to the ECHR, constitutional traditions prevalent in the member states 
and, to a lesser extent, treaties from the United Nations. 139 However, it was 
not until the year 2000 the EU adopted its own Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (CFR) and it did not become legally binding until 2009 when the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Hence CFR is regarded as primary EU 
law, on the same level as EU Treaties.140 Article 6 Treaty on the European 
Union (TEU) clarifies the status of CFR in the EU and for its member states. 
Before 2009 the human rights within the EU were protected mainly based 
on the litigation process of the European Court of Justice. It was previously 
an ad hoc kind of evolvement of human rights protection in the EU and no 
coherent system was available. This approach has lead to a less coherent 
overview of the rights protected. The CFR’s actual impact on the ECJ’s case 
law has been disputed since some argue that the Court rather cited the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) than the CFR during the 
first years.141 
 
The CFR as a human rights instrument entails 50 rights and principles that 
have derived their design from other human rights treaties such as from the 
United Nations (UN) or from the ECHR. Included in these rights are civil 
and political rights and social, economic and cultural rights but also so-
called third generation’s rights which are aimed to be of a more general and 
worldwide nature. Important to notice is nevertheless that the CFR is only 
applicable as far as it concerns EU related situations that involve EU law. 
142,143  
 
Moreover, the CFR is regarded to be less exhaustive and protective in its 
character than many other human rights instruments. As was described 
                                                
137 Scott, Sionaidh Douglas, The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of 
Lisbon, Human Rights Law Review 11:4 (2011), p. 646-647.  
138 Article 6(3) of the TEU (2008) OJ C 115/15 states: ‘The Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to member states as general 
principles of Community law.” 
139 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Europé Regional 
Office, The European Union and International Human Rights Law, p.9. 
140 EU:s webpage http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm 
accessed: 2015-05-17. 
141 Scott, Sionaidh Douglas, op.cit., p. 647-649. 
142 Article 51 CFR. 
143 Scott, Sionaidh Douglas, op.cit., p. 651-652. 
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earlier in the chapter on the respect, protect and fulfil, the typology is often 
invoked in relation to the discussion of the content of rights and state 
obligations. CFR is by some considered to cover only the respect part of the 
typology, which relates to the negative obligation of a party not to interfere 
in a right, at least as long as it concerns principles and not rights.144 The 
distinction between rights and principles in the CFR is not made explicitly 
clear. Some interpretations indicate that principles refer to economic, social 
and cultural provisions whilst civil and political provisions are rights. 
However, this is not clearly convincing since only three articles in CFR 
actually are named “principles” but more articles refer to economic, social 
and cultural rights in reality.145 It has been argued that the limitation to 
include only the “respect” part of the tripartite typology relates only to the 
principles and that the rights enshrined in the CFR should include the whole 
typology. 146 The legal implications that are imposed by CFR on EU 
member states are therefore not fully established and one explanation might 
be the relatively short existence of the Charter in the international human 
rights arena.  
 
The child’s position and actual recognition in EU law has not been 
explicitly stated until the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009. 
Before 2009 there was only general provisions concerning the importance of 
respecting human rights in the actions taken within the EU framework. 
Today in article 3(3) second paragraph and article 3(5) TEU the protection 
of children’s rights is mentioned as a fundamental cornerstone of EU.147 In 
relation to the CFR, children are explicitly mentioned two times, firstly in 
article 14 CFR on their right to education further deliberated on in detail 
below in the next sub-chapter, and in article 24 CFR which is where the best 
interest of the child is stated in the following terms: 
 
The rights of the child 
1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary 
for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall 
be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance 
with their age and maturity.  
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or 
private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary 
consideration.  
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal 
relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is 
contrary to his or her interests.   
                                                
144 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Europe Regional 
Office, The European Union and International Human Rights Law, p.14. 
145 Scott, Sionaidh Douglas, op.cit., p. 652. 
146 Lenaerts, Koen, Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, 
European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 8, Issue 3, 2012, p. 399- 401. 
147 Stalford, Helen and Shuurman, Mieke, Are We There Yet?: the Impact of the Lisbon 
Treaty on the EU Children’s Rights Agenda, International Journal of Children’s Rights 19 
(2011), p.382. 
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In the TFEU the lack of explicit reference to children and their need of 
protection of their rights is noteworthy, especially in relation to the general 
provisions that are stipulated in articles 7-17 TFEU, which include the 
combat of discrimination and social exclusion, the importance of equality 
between the sexes, protection for consumers etc. The TFEU fails to 
particularly deal with one of the most vulnerable groups, children, within 
the union except for in two particular cases concerning sexual exploitation 
and human trafficking (articles 79(2)(d) and 83(1)). In order to derive 
children’s right from the TFEU one has to use the more general and 
universally applicable provisions on non-discrimination (article 19 TFEU) 
and EU citizenship (article 21 TFEU).148 
 
3.3.1 The European Union and the Right to 
Education 
The historical background of the EU with its emphasis on the common 
market and the economic incentives behind the foundation of the movement 
has been described in a previous chapter. It cannot be a surprise that the 
right to education within the EU has evolved through the economic values 
that underpins the organization, even though this right for children has roots 
in international treaties (see chapter 3.1) as well as in national legislation 
(see chapter 4) and EU legislation.149 As mentioned in chapter 2.1.2 the EU 
has supporting competence in areas relating to education, article 4(e) TFEU. 
The supporting competence relates to the structure and the content of the 
education, whereas the right to education is laid down in the EU’s Charter 
on Fundamental Rights.  
 
This section will go through the relevant provisions regarding education in 
EU law. Education is primarily regulated in article 14 CFR that reads as 
follows:  
 
Right to Education 
 
1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational 
and continuing training. 
2. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory 
education. 
3. The freedom to found educational establishments with due respect 
for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the 
education and teaching of their children in conformity with their 
religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be 
respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the 
exercise of such freedom and right. 
                                                
148 Stalford, Helen and Shuurman, Mieke, op.cit.,  p.383-383. 
149 Stalford, Helen, Children and the European Union: rights, welfare and accountability, 
Hart, Oxford, 2012, p. 143-145. 
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Compared to other international instruments regulating the right to 
education this provision in the EU law tends to give the impression that it is 
less obligatory for the member states to provide education and that the 
obligation is less exhaustive than in other instruments regulating the right to 
education. In the second paragraph certain concern can arise in relation to 
the “possibility” to receive free education. This phrasing is far from the 
strict formulations that are found in other provisions that include a right for 
an individual and an opposed duty for the state to provide education.150 
However, a more rights-based interpretation can be done if the possibility in 
the second paragraph instead is interpreted as having its focus on the free 
education. Then the CFR can be relied upon in order to prove that primary 
education should be cost free education. So, in reality it might, depending 
on way of interpretation, actually be a stronger protection than in most 
international conventions. 
 
Before the Maastricht Treaty the main competence of the EU was in relation 
to the economic sphere and workers. The right to education was hence, in 
the initial stage of the EU, primarily regulated only when it had a 
connection to the competence of the EU and the right as such was not 
applicable to a wider sphere of children living in the EU. Even though the 
expansion of the competence that EU has had in the education field, the 
regulations still tend to give a lot of decision power to the member states 
when it comes to the shape and content of the education as such.151, 152 
 
An interesting aspect on EU law and the right to education arises in the 
context of free movement of persons and EU citizenship. The direct law-
making power that the EU has in the area of free movement and education 
has created an absolute right for migrating children to enjoy equal access to 
education as nationals in the host state. The categories that are included are 
children to parents who qualify as workers153, third country nationals who 
are long term residents154 and asylum seekers155,156. What this absolute right 
                                                
150 Ibid, p. 145-146. 
151 See the formulation in article 165(1) TFEU: “The Union shall contribute to the 
development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, 
if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of 
education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity. (…)” 
152 Stalford, Helen, op.cit. , p.146-147. 
153 See: article 7.1 (a) Directive 2004/38 and Reg 492/2011 article 10.  
154 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning third country nationals who are long-term 
residents 2003/109 OJ L16/44, 23/01/04, article 11 and 14. 
155 Article 14(1) in Directive 2001/55 states that: ”The Member States shall grant to 
persons under 18 years age enjoying temporary protection access to the education system 
under the same conditions as nationals of the host member state. The Member state may 
stipulate that such access must be confined to the state education system.”. 
156 Article 14(1) in 2013/33/EU, ”Member States shall grant to minor children of applicants 
and to applicants who are minors access to the education system under similar conditions 
as their own nationals for so long as an expulsion measure against them or their parents is 
not actually enforced. Such education may be provided in accommodation centres.” OJ L 
180, 29.6.2013. 
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actually implies and if it has an absolute character when it concerns EU-
migrants exercising their freedom of movement for a maximum of three 
months is what this study aims to investigate. 157 
 
Case law in this area has been limited and there is only one case that refers 
to article 14 CFR, a case of scarce importance for this thesis. In relation to 
the article 24 CFR, the rights of child, there have been 31 references to the 
article, however none in relation to the right to education. The article has 
been mainly used in asylum cases and custody cases. It shows that the right 
to education has not been a matter of debate, at least for the ECJ.158 
 
3.4 The Council of Europe’s Regional 
System for Protection of Human 
Rights and its Relationship to the 
European Union 
In the context of EU it is important to clarify the position of the ECHR 
within the EU. The ECHR is a separate and individual treaty that the ECJ 
has referred to many times in its case law. The ECHR was adopted by the 
Council of Europe and it regulates civil and political rights. It came into 
force in 1953 and it is binding to its members.159 The Council of Europe has 
47 member states whence 28 also are members of the EU. The ECHR was 
created in the aftermath of the Second World War and it has been described 
as “a type of collective pact against totalitarianism”160. The purpose was to 
create an international instrument that was binding upon the parties in an 
attempt to avoid a repetition of the horrible actions that had taken place in 
the past. The ECtHR has been able to function as an important tool and 
guidance for human rights interpretation in the 47 contracting states and has 
also laid down judgements of high importance and good quality.161 When 
the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009 article 6(3) TEU emphasises 
the importance of the ECHR in EU law. It reads as follows:  
 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union's law. 
 
                                                
157 Stalford, Helen, op.cit, p. 153-155. 
158 For case law based on a specific CFR article see FRA webpage: 
http://infoportal.fra.europa.eu/InfoPortal/caselawFrontEndAccess.do accessed 2015-05-11. 
159 European Court of Human Rights webpage on the background of ECHR: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts&c=#n1359128122487_pointer 
accessed: 2015-05-11. 
160 Christoffersen, Jonas. & Madsen, Mikael Rask. (ed.), The European Court of Human 
Rights between law and politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p.40. 
161 Ibid., p. 100, 111. 
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The article 6(3) TEU acknowledge the ECHR as one of the sources for the 
ECJ’s decisions. ECJ has the possibility to go beyond the protection laid 
down in ECHR and therefore extends its protection to encompass more than 
the ECHR does. Hence, the ECHR provisions serve as a minimum.162 
Another important step towards EU accession to the ECHR is stressed in 
article 6(2) TEU where it is stated expressly that the EU shall accede to the 
ECHR. However, this process has not been finalized yet. 163  
 
Due to the importance of the ECHR and its decisions for EU law a short 
description of the relevant provisions stemming from ECHR will be given 
as well as some case law that might be of guidance. The right to education is 
enshrined in the first additional protocol to the ECHR and it is stated that:  
 
Article 2 
Right to Education 
 
“No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any 
functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the 
State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and 
teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions.” 164  
 
Firstly, one can consider the relationship between the two sentences in the 
article and what it implies. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has stated that the first sentence is the dominant one and the primary right. 
The formulation implies that the right of the child is considered as stronger 
than those of the parents.165 What the right to education actually includes 
has been subject to interpretation already in one of the earliest cases from 
ECtHR, The Belgian Linguistic Case166. The term education has been 
interpreted to encompass all levels of education, primarily because the states 
within the Council of Europe system often have made both primary and 
                                                
162 Craig, Paul & De Búrca, Gráinne, op.cit., p.366-367. 
163 In December 2014 the ECJ delivered its judgement on the accession and it had identified 
problems with regard to ECHR’s compatibility with EU law. The accession can not 
interfere with the competences of the EU and the power of its institutions and laws. 
However the ECJ identified several critical issues which included: the external control by 
the ECHR would not be in accordance with the interpretation of EU law, the ECHR should 
be coordinated with the CFR and the autonomy of the EU would be undermined as well as 
the autonomy of the preliminary ruling procedure. When an accession is possible is 
therefore not yet possible to say, see: The European Court of Justice, The Court of Justice 
delivers its opinion on the draft agreement on the accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
identifies problems with regard to its compatibility with EU law, Press Release 180/14, 
Opinion 2/13, Luxemburg 18 December 2014. 
164 Art 2, Additional Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
165 See Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, Application no. 7511/76; 7743/76 
(1982), para 50. 
166 Case ”Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the use of Languages in Education in 
Belgium" v. Belgium, Application no 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 
2126/64, 1968. 
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secondary education compulsory and it would be contrary to an effective 
protection of the right not to include all levels of education in the right.167 
 
As one may have noted in this chapter, the wording of the right to education 
takes different forms in different provisions and the obligation and right it 
creates may then be differently interpreted. The negative formulation that is 
used in the protocol to the ECHR indicates that there exists a negative 
(instead of a positive) state obligation. This negative formulation has been 
explained by the ECtHR to mean that a state is not obliged to set up 
educational system of “any particular type or level”168. The ECtHR states in 
the Belgian Lingustic Case that the right to education meant “guaranteeing 
to persons subject to the jurisdiction of one of the contracting parties, the 
right, in principle, to avail themselves of the means of instruction existing at 
a given time”169.  Conclusively, three rights which are included in the 
concept of education can be distinguished, namely: “a right to non-
discriminatory access to educational institutions existing at a given time; a 
right to receive education in national language and a right to official 
recognition of studies successfully completed”170. Despite its negative 
formulation of the right to education it is obvious that it also entails and 
gives rise to positive state obligations. To find otherwise would be contrary 
to the spirit of the ECHR. A minimum level of education is therefore 
required by the state to offer as part of its positive obligations. 171 For the 
purpose of this study the parental rights that are enshrined in the right to 
education will not be further investigated. 
 
Compared to the ECJ the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
dealt with the right to education numerous times. The majority of the cases 
relating to the right to education in ECtHR have touched upon the negative 
obligation of states not to interfere in the given education. A couple of cases 
have engaged in the introduction of different religious aspects, or exclusion 
of certain religions, from education.172 Other cases have dealt with the 
linguistic aspects of the education.173 One case that touches upon similarities 
with the freedom of movement and the right to education is the Timishev v. 
Russia case.174  The case concerned an ethnic Chechen national who lived in 
Russia with his family, but no longer was registered in the city the family 
lived in and additionally he no longer had a migrant’s card since he had 
                                                
167 Beiter, Klaus Dieter, op.cit., p. 159-161. 
168 Case ”Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the use of Languages in Education in 
Belgium" v. Belgium, Application no 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 
2126/64, 1968, para.3 in section B ”Interpretation adopted by the Court”.  
169 Ibid. 
170 Beiter, Klaus Dieter, op.cit., p. 163. 
171 Beiter, Klaus Dieter, op.cit., p. 164-166. 
172 See for instance: Folgerø and Others v. Norway, application no. 15472/02 (2007), 
Hansan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, application no. 1448/04 (2007), Mansur Yalçin and 
Others v. Turkey, application no. 21163/11 (2014). 
173 See for instance: Case ”Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the use of Languages 
in Education in Belgium" v. Belgium, Application no 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 
1994/63; 2126/64, 1968 and Catan and Others c. the Republic of Moldavia and Russia 
(2012). 
174 Timishev v. Russia, application no: 55762/00 and 55974/00 (2006). 
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been forced to give it away in exchange for property. The children were 
denied access to education, despite their previous attendance in the Russian 
school for two years, due to the father’s loss of the migrant’s card. The 
ECtHR concluded that the right to education is a right available to anyone 
within a contracting state’s jurisdiction. Furthermore it stated that: Article 2 
of Protocol No. 1 prohibits the denial of the right to education. This 
provision has no stated exceptions and its structure is similar to that of 
Articles 2 and 3, Article 4 § 1 and Article 7 of the Convention (“No one 
shall ...”), which together enshrine the most fundamental values of the 
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. In a democratic 
society, the right to education, which is indispensable to the furtherance of 
human rights, plays such a fundamental role that a restrictive interpretation 
of the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 would not be consistent 
with the aim or purpose of that provision.”175 Since the right to education in 
Russia is not conditional upon the parents’ registration of their residence, 
the ECtHR found the denial of the children’s school attendance to be a 
violation of the right to education enshrined in the ECHR.176  
 
The circumstances of this case differ of course from the situation for those 
who exercise their freedom of movement within the EU for a maximum of 
three months (Russia is not a member of the EU for example). But the 
ECtHR makes an important statement in this case – that the right to 
education is unconditional for anyone within a contracting state’s 
jurisdiction. This statement is perhaps even more important for the group 
that this study discusses since some groups of the EU-migrants are more 
vulnerable and marginalised and left to rely on the practices and conduct of 
the host state’s authorities. By referring to other international conventions in 
the Timishev case as well as in other judgments, the ECtHR reaffirms and 
acknowledges the content of the international obligation to fulfil the 
tripartite typology in relation to the right to education.  
 
The European Social Charter (ESC) is the other main document created by 
the Council of Europe. The creation of the charter, in 1961, was made in 
order to complement the civil and political rights in the ECHR with social, 
economic and cultural rights in ESC. The right to education is laid down in 
several articles, but does not in itself form a specific article. The reference to 
the right to education can be found in article 7(3), 9, 10, 15(1), 17(1)(a)-(2) 
and 19(11)-(12). By laying down the right to education also in the ESC, the 
other side of the right, the economic, social and cultural was also 
acknowledged. It is noteworthy that in article 19(11)-(12) ESC the right for 
migrant workers’ children to education in language, both of the receiving 
state and the mother tongue, is provided for. This indicates a form of 
educational rights for migrant workers. The term migrant worker is however 
not defined in the ESC and the uncertainty of who is deemed as a worker 
continues. 177  
 
                                                
175 Ibid., para. 64. 
176 Ibid., para. 9-11, 22-27, 63-67. 
177 Beiter, Klaus Dieter, op.cit., p. 172-175. 
 50 
3.5 Concluding remarks  
The right to education has been subject to regulation in if not all, at least in 
the majority of international human rights instruments. It is regarded as one 
of the most fundamental rights and one of the most necessary to enjoy in 
order to enjoy other rights. As has been shown the structure of the right in 
the different instruments varies, but the core right is nevertheless the same- 
the right to education should be available to everyone and a denial of the 
right is almost impossible. Different analytical tools have been developed in 
order to encompass the complexity of the right to education and the essence 
of it. What still differ between the different international treaties available 
are the persons who are protected and able to enjoy the right to education. 
Sometimes a jurisdictional or territorial clause is included, but how it 
applies to the right to education within the regional system of EU-migrants 
who exercise their freedom of movement for a maximum of three months is 
not clear in the international human rights instruments. The question of 
responsibility for ensuring the right to education, and which state, in a union 
of states which have given up some of their sovereignty and some of their 
immigration control, that is responsible for ensuring the right, is not 
something that the international treaties are made to regulate. In this legal 
lacuna a large group of people are finding themselves today. What is clear is 
that the EU Citizenship Directive must be interpreted in the light of CFR. In 
turn, CFR is interpreted in the light of ECHR, an instrument which has 
expressed convincing argumentation that the right to education has to be 
acknowledged for all persons finding themselves within the territory of a 
member state. The Timishev case undoubtedly reinforces the view that the 
CFR has to be interpreted in accordance with that judgement and the 
Citizenship Directive has to be interpreted in accordance with CFR, despite 
that it is not expressly established.  The right to education is a right of a 
fundamental character, with no explicit exceptions and with no possibilities 
to strict and narrow interpretations since it would inhibit the purpose and 
aim of the right itself. In the international human rights law the division 
between economically active parents exercising their freedom of movement 
for a maximum of three months and other persons exercising their freedom 
of movement despite lack of financial resources, is not a problem. The 
character of the right to education does not enable a possibility to interpret 
the right differently depending on financial resources and reasons of the 
residence in the host state. 
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4 The Swedish Example 
This chapter will contextualize what previous chapters have set out and 
described as the law and case law regarding the free movement of persons. 
The reasons for people to exercise their freedom of movement for a 
maximum of three months can differ widely. Except the group of workers’ 
and their children’s immediate access to education, a wide range of EU-
citizens with different agendas and objectives can use their right to move 
freely within the Union. It can be a businessman or woman who is 
temporarily living in another country but who does not qualify as a worker 
but instead is a self-employed person or a service-provider. It can also be a 
person who seeks a change in his or her life and moves to another country in 
order to seek a job. On the other end of the scale are persons who move to 
another country in hope for better living or in order to gain some money by 
begging, collecting cans for recycling or selling street-papers. As preceding 
chapters have demonstrated each of these groups face the same challenge in 
relation to accessing education for their children in the host member state. In 
this chapter the situation of Roma persons coming to Sweden will be further 
explored since it has been an increasing issue in Sweden and the politicians 
and authorities remain uncertain about what their obligations are and what 
rights they have to respect when they handle this peculiar situation.178  
 
Firstly, the situation of Roma as a minority will be developed upon in the 
context of EU. Thereafter a short description about the factual situation in 
Sweden will be given. Then an overview of the Swedish legislation on 
education will be provided. The last parts of this chapter will engage in the 
concept of begging and whether it can constitute work within the meaning it 
has in EU law according to the principles laid down in previous chapters. If 
so, the right to education for the children of Roma beggars is ascertained on 
that ground. Moreover, it will be explored if there is any other way of 
solving the problem through the interpretation of the existing legal 
frameworks in this particular situation.  
 
4.1 Roma and Their Situation in the 
European Union 
This section will give an insight in the work that is carried out in EU for the 
minority group Roma. An overview will give some insight to the complex 
situation that is found in Europe today and it will also point out the wide 
discrimination that the Roma has been, and still is, a target for. To get a 
general perception on the situation for Roma is important in order to 
understand underlying conceptions that still today effects decision-making.  
                                                
178 See statement from the Ministry of Education and Research in the email communication 
between the Ministry of Education and Research and the author. See supplement 1.  
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As already has been stressed out this study will use the Council of Europe 
(COE) definition of Roma179. However, it is clear that the definition of 
Roma may very well differ between persons since it is a term that not yet 
has been established due to the discrepancies and uncertainties that still exist 
in regard to the knowledge about the history of the Roma. To use the word 
Roma in academic writing is of course problematic since in reality the term 
Roma includes a diverse range of people with different languages, religions, 
political views and history and different possibilities to access social 
benefits in the society. To narrow down a diverse population to one word in 
order to write an academic paper as well as try to clarify legal issues which 
concern this diverse group, is and will be a simplification. However, 
sometimes it is necessary to do so in order to get a chance to elucidate the 
problems and discrimination that are more prevalent among this diverse 
group.180 
 
Since the Roma have very different backgrounds when it comes to the 
language they speak, the religion they believe in and their economic and 
social welfare situation, it also differs within Europe if they are travellers or 
sedentary. The majority of the Roma are still today living in eastern-central 
and the south of Europe even though some have settled in the northern part 
of Europe. 181 The population of Roma in Europe is estimated to be around 
10-12 million whence 6 million lives in the EU. 182 It is however hard to 
estimate the total population of Roma in Europe because not all are 
registered in a national population register and therefore the estimation may 
differ.183 By attributing Roma the epithet as “vagabonds, beggars and 
criminals”184 acts of slavery, genocide and assimilation have been justified. 
Unfortunately, the negative historical representation of Roma is still today 
very much evident in the European context. The significance and the 
characteristics of Roma are today heavily decided upon the majority’s will 
and influence.185 
 
Firstly, when one handles the identity of Roma one has to separate between 
ethnic identity and civic identity in order not to confuse the legal 
implications that follow from the different identities. The former is linked to 
the Roma identity and the latter is connected to the civic identity that is 
determined upon the belonging to a nation state such as for example 
                                                
179 See footnote 6. 
180 McGary, Aidan, Roma as a political identity: Exploring representations of Roma in 
Europe, Ethnicities 2014 Vol. 14(6), p. 2.   
181 Council of Europe, Human Rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe, Council of Europe 
Publishing, Strasbourg, 2012, p. 31. 
182 European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA): 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/roma accessed: 2015-05-11. 
183 Gynther, Päivi, From utopia to quintessence: education law from the viewpoint of Roma 
and skills deficiency, Diss. Åbo Akademi, Åbo: Åbo Akademi University, 2006, p. 17. 
184 Stauber, Roni & Vago, Raphael (ed.), The Roma: a minority in Europe : historical, 
political and social perspectives, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2007, p. 8. 
185 McGary, Aidan, op.cit.  p. 5. 
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Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania. 186 The Roma have been described as the 
biggest minority187 in Europe and in the EU, however there are some who, 
due to the non-legal binding character and status in international documents 
of the word “minority” problematize the actual concept and whether Roma 
fall within the term minority.188 For the purpose of this study Roma will be 
dealt with as a minority because the EU has recognized and described Roma 
as a minority. 189  
 
In the EU the problem of discrimination against Roma and other groups that 
are exposed for racism and discrimination has been subject for different 
forms of actions throughout the years. The Directive 2000/43/EC190 
concerning equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, addresses 
both direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to 
discriminate.191 The Directive was more modern than existing legislation 
since it protects all persons and it applies in both public and private sectors. 
Moreover, the scope of the Directive extends to new spheres that previously 
have not expressly been protected such as education, health care and 
housing. 192,193 
 
Besides Directive 2000/43/EC the EU has taken further steps in order to 
combat the inequalities and discrimination that occurs against the Roma in 
Europe by launching their EU Framework for National Roma Integration 
strategies up to 2020. This campaign is a step that will engage national 
member states to diminish the gap between Roma and non-Roma in their 
access to education, employment, housing and health care.  The Member 
states are required to report to the European Parliament and the Council 
every year on the national progression in this matter.194  
 
In relation to this project for Roma Integration within the EU the European 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) launches reports on the development 
                                                
186 Marushiakova Elena & Popov Vesselin,”Gypsy” groups in Eastern Europe: Ethnonyms 
vs . proffesionyms, Romani Studies 5, Vol. 23, no.1 (2013), p.62. 
187 For the definition of minority see for example Francesco Capotori’s definition in Study 
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Lingustic Minorites, New 
York, United Nations 1991: a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a 
State, in a non-dominant position, whose members- being nationals of the State - possess 
ethnic, religious, or lingustic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the 
population, and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving 
their culture, traditions, religion, or language.  
188 See for instance: Gynther, Päivi, From utopia to quintessence: education law from the 
viewpoint of Roma and skills deficiency, Diss. Åbo Akademi, Åbo: Åbo Akademi 
University, 2006, p. 20-28. 
189 See for instance: EU’s webpage ”EU and Roma” 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en.htm accessed: 2015-05-11. 
190 Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June implementing the princple of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal L180 19/07/2000 P.0022-
0026. 
191 See article 2 Directive 2000/43/EC for definitions. 
192 See article 3 Directive 2000/43/EC for the scope of the directive. 
193 COM (2006)643 Final. On the application of Directive 2000/43/EC. 
194 Report on the Implementation of the EU Framework for National Integration Strategies 
COM(2014)209 final, p. 1. 
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in the targeted areas. The most recent report concerning the right to 
education for Roma was issued in October 2014.195 The attendance of Roma 
children in school is considerably lower than for those who are non-Roma 
and the early drop-outs are higher among the Roma children. In the 11 
countries that were reviewed in 2014 (Sweden was not included) the non-
attendance of Roma children was 14 % compared to 3 % for children with a 
non-Roma background. The main reason for these alarming figures for 
Roma children is a late start in school and irregular attendance that results in 
early drop-outs. 196 
 
When one studies these figures it is important, for the purpose of this thesis, 
to remember that the figures are based on the ethnic identity of Roma and 
included in the survey are both citizens and non-citizens of the country 
concerned. It is therefore not exclusively a presentation of figures for Roma, 
exercising their right to free movement to a country in which they are not 
nationals and as a consequence of that, in the host state, not being able to get 
access to the education system. The figures presented in the FRA reports are 
heavily based on the ethnic identity and it makes it impossible to use the 
study in order to see the access to education for Roma children possessing 
an EU-citizenship, but residing outside their home country for a maximum 
of three months. No study has explicitly studied the data for Roma children 
in this situation referred to in the previous sentence, but based on media and 
news and observations it could be stated that the school attendance of this 
group is very low.197,198 
 
4.2 The Present Situation of Roma 
European Union Migrants in Sweden 
The situation of Roma EU-migrants coming to Sweden by exercising their 
right to freedom of movement has been heavily reported in the news in 
Sweden during the last year.199 The increase in EU-migrants with Roma 
background coming to Sweden was significant in 2014 and the reason for 
                                                
195 FRA, Education: The situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States, Luxemburg, 2014. 
Accessible at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014_roma-
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197 FRA, Education: op.cit., p. 56-57. 
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Maria, Svenska Dagbladet, Få barn till EU-migranter får skolgång, 
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this migration is, according to many of the interviewed Roma persons in the 
news, their hope to get a job and a better living in Sweden.200 Romania and 
Bulgaria, situated in the Eastern Europe are where the majority of the Roma 
population in the EU lives today although the Roma is a diverse group 
spread all over the world. 201 The increase in Roma migrants and the reason 
behind it is not fully established. What one can note is that Romania and 
Bulgaria became members of the EU in 2007202 but until the year 2014 the 
countries’ citizens had restrictions on their freedom of movement. These 
restrictions meant that a work permit was needed in order to freely move to 
some of the member countries. The restrictions were gradually released and 
on the 1st of January 2014 they were fully removed. What impact the 
releasing of the restrictions can have had on the increased mobility and the 
actual number of Roma EU-migrants exercising their freedom of movement 
is not statistically confirmed.203 
 
The exact number of Roma EU-migrants in Sweden is hard to estimate since 
there is no registration criterion when one is entering an EU member state as 
a Union Citizen.204 According to a survey carried out by the Swedish 
Television (Sveriges Television) in April 2015, approximately 4000 
homeless EU-migrants live in 241 out of the 290 municipalities that exist in 
Sweden. However, this survey is not comprehensive and amongst the 
municipalities that answered the survey there were some who were 
uncertain about the actual amount of Roma EU-migrants in their 
municipality. Moreover, the amount of EU-migrants in Sweden has doubled 
in one year. 205  
 
The living conditions of the unknown, but significant, number of Roma EU-
migrants in Sweden are generally poor as well as their access to social 
benefits and access to education. In late 2014 the access to education for the 
accompanying children to those Roma EU-migrants differed among the 
municipalities and The Swedish National Agency for Education has clearly 
expressed its view that the legal position for those children is uncertain both 
in relation to national law and its relation to EU-law.206 The Ministry for 
Education and Research has confirmed this statement.207 The municipalities 
                                                
200 Ibid. 
201 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Descriptive Glossary of terms relating to Roma 
issues, 2012, p. 5-6. 
202 For more information about the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU see the 
European Union’s Official Journal OJ L 157 of 25 April 2005, available at: http://eur-
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204 The freedom of movement is deliberated upon in the previous chapter 2. 
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in Sweden therefore differ in their treatment of those children and it is only 
in some municipalities that these children have access to education.208,209 
 
The present situation in Sweden shows that the Government as well as the 
municipalities are finding themselves in a situation that is difficult to solve 
due to the differences in legal frameworks in their mutual application. The 
legal lacuna that exists for this specific group of EU-migrants results in 
people not getting access to the human rights that they are entitled to 
according to international legislation. Moreover this situation shows that 
loopholes in the legislation lead to that human rights are being overridden 
when they are needed at its most. 
 
4.2.1 Swedish Legislation on Education 
This section will further examine the right to education, but in a national 
context. For the purpose of this study it is important to know, when one 
contextualizes the problem in a national setting, how the legal frameworks 
coexist with EU and international legislation. The national Education Act in 
Sweden, Skollagen, sets out the detailed provisions regulating the content 
and form of education in Sweden. In Sweden a new Education Act 
(Skollagen)210 entered into force in 2010. The Swedish system of access to 
education is based on the registration of the child in the national population 
register. For those children who are nationally registered there is 
compulsory school attendance from the year the child turn seven years old 
and it lasts until the child has turned 16 (9 years of compulsory 
education).211  
 
The right to education, however, is not dependent upon the population 
register. Everyone that is nationally registered automatically has a right to 
education. This right is extended to other groups of children who need 
education but are not nationally registered. The aim with the new law and its 
amendment was to make it clearer for certain groups of children that they 
enjoy a right to education and these groups include asylum seekers, 
undocumented children and those who have the right to education as a result 
of EU law.212 
 
The objective of including other groups than nationals in the right to 
education is evident through the legislation and especially its later 
amendment in 2013. The reasoning behind the extension of the right to 
education to undocumented migrants is that the government considered it 
                                                
208 Kurkiala Medbo, Tova- Sveriges Radio, Svårt med skola för barn till EU-migranter 
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=114&artikel=5996267 published 21 
october 2014, accessed 2015-05-11. 
209 Sundén Jelmini, Maria-Svenska Dagbladet, Få barn till EU-migranter får skolgång, 
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/fa-barn-till-eu-migranter-far-skolgang_4224581.svd 
published 2 january 2015, accessed 2015-05-11. 
210 Skollag SFS: 2010:800. 
211 Skollag 2010:800 chapter 7 para.10 and 12. 
212 Prop. 2009/10:165 p. 333, 589-590. 
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important to offer education to children who find themselves in this difficult 
situation and it also raises their prospects of better wellbeing 
psychologically, physically and socially.213 
 
In the government bill concerning the amendment to extend the group of 
persons to include “all” children, i.e. undocumented migrants, the 
government held a discussion about the potential need of having a 
delimitation of the target group as to the time the children were supposed to 
be in Sweden. The government concluded however that such a limitation 
would be hard to make in practice since very often these children and their 
families move between municipalities to hide and there is no possibility to 
estimate the time they will stay in Sweden. Moreover, the Government 
argues that for those staying less than three to four months there is 
“probably no need for education and they will to a very low extent make 
such claims”214. 215 
 
The only group that, according to the Government in the government bill 
2012/13:58, is not entitled to the right to education is children who have 
time-limited residence permits for a maximum of one year. Considerations 
will be taken in relation to the question if the right should be extended to 
include also this group of children.216 The problematic formulation is that 
the Education Act entitles “children who has the right to education as a 
result of EU-law”217 to invoke the right to education. Nevertheless, as has 
been shown no such right to education is mentioned in the EU Citizenship 
Directive, the case law or any other EU-instrument for the first three 
months. Therefore, the national and regional frameworks seem to leave the 
situation for EU-migrants who not are worker’s children unregulated.218 
 
The status of the CRC in Sweden is of importance for how the convention is 
and should be applied in legal settings. Sweden has ratified CRC and it is 
therefore legally binding in the state. However, the CRC is not incorporated 
in Swedish legislation which has raised some concern because it might lead 
to that authorities are able to ignore the legal binding effect of the CRC 
more easily. Swedish laws should be changed and adapted after the CRC but 
that can be a less effective way of securing the rights enshrined in CRC.  
Voices have been raised that the CRC should be legislated and incorporated 
in Swedish law in order to make it more efficient.219   
 
 
                                                
213 Prop. 2012/13:58 p. 12. 
214 Prop. 2012/13:58 p. 14. 
215 Ibid, p.14. 
216 Ibid, p. 16-17. 
217 Ibid, p. 16. In Swedish: ”…barn som har rätt till utbildning till följd av EU-rätten…”. 
218 Ibid, p. 16. 
219 Unicef, https://unicef.se/projekt/gor-barnkonventionen-till-lag accessed: 2015-05-11. 
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4.3 Does a Right to Education Exist in the 
Roma Context? 
This section will use the knowledge presented previously about the 
definition of work within the EU. In the specific context of Roma EU-
migrants in Sweden who beg, collect cans or sell street papers, it will be 
analysed if their activity possibly could amount to work and thereby give 
their children a right to education. Firstly a discussion on the definition of 
begging will be presented in order to see its relevance and connection to the 
concept of work. Thereafter the definition of begging, collecting cans and 
sales of street papers will be applied to the criteria that have been described 
in chapter 2 as regards the case law from ECJ on work and what can be 
included in the concept. Since the status of the parent as a self-employed 
person or job-seeking person does not entitle the child to an express right to 
education, begging will not be contextualised in relation to self-employment 
and job-seeking. 
 
4.3.1 The Definition of Begging 
Despite that begging has existed and been documented for an indefinite, but 
long period of time, no universal definition of the activity has been 
established in any of the disciplines that have been working with it. Begging 
as a concept is scarcely documented as a research field in itself, instead it 
has been studied through the lenses of legal, social, historical or cultural 
theories. This lack of consensus and differentiated definitions and 
explanations of the concept of begging constitutes a problem when one has 
to work with it and understand its implications in different situations. In the 
situation on which this thesis is built it is important to know the definition of 
begging in order to see what legal implications that follow from it and 
especially for the purpose of this study, if it can be considered work within 
the meaning of EU law and jurisprudence.220  
 
Begging can in some states constitute a criminal act whereas in other states 
it is accepted as a form of gaining an income. Its definition ranges from 
wide to narrow and some definitions tend to label it as a form of work. In an 
attempt to crystalize a minimum definition of begging certain elements can 
be identified. Begging is often described as: “a public request for money, 
food, or other goods, with little or nothing of value given in return”221,222. 
The relationship that emerges between the giver and the receiver is often 
                                                
220 Brito, Oliver, Definitional Paradox and Legal Heterogenity: Towards a Comprehensive 
and Operational Defintion of Begging, Asian Social Work and Policy Review 7 (2013), 
Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd (2013), p. 228-229. 
221 Ibid, p. 232. 
222 For comparison see the definition of begging by Philip Lynch: ” Begging, or gathering 
alms, can be defined as the solicitation of a voluntary unilateral gift - most often money – in 
a public place”. Lynch, Philip, Understanding and Responding to Begging, Vol 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 518 (2005). 
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unequal and the common perception is that the giver is doing an act of 
charity and goodness whilst the receiver is perceived as an immoral person, 
a perception which often creates stigma to the beggars. Begging is 
considered to be a “street-level economic activity”223 amongst some 
researchers but among the majority of the beggars themselves it is perceived 
as a work.224 
 
From both a materialistic and a symbolic perspective it can be argued that 
begging is similar to an economic activity comparable to work. There might 
be cases where the beggar is offering something material by framing it as 
sale of something in order not to be disturbed in his or her activity. By 
framing begging as sales it implies that there exists some kind of 
authorization. In other cases the symbolic interaction between the giver and 
receiver can be seen as a win-win situation, for example in religious 
situations or when the givers’ fortunate situations are legitimized by the 
alms-giving. However, there are critiques against the labelling of begging, 
or panhandling, as a form of work. Brito claims that the lack of a productive 
element of a material character is the springing point where work and 
begging differs. Regardless of whether begging should be considered a 
formal, or more likely, an informal form of work, the productivity is lacking 
according to Brito. Instead Brito draws parallels between begging, politics 
and religion. He argues that they all share the common feature that they 
raise awareness about social issues. Brito justifies the similarities with other 
areas such as religion and politics by claiming that begging can be regarded 
as “an indirect contribution to the democratic process”225. However, there 
are several forms of work today which do not include any material character 
such as priesthood and psychologists etc.  
 
Conclusively, there does not exist any universal, formal definition of 
begging. The lack of a universal definition gives space for different 
treatment and the legal implications of the act are highly diverging. 226 Due 
to the need of a specified definition of a word in order to use it for legal 
purposes it is a shortcoming that no general definition of begging is at hand. 
The next subsection will deliberate on how work has been defined in the 
case law from ECJ and how the term has evolved and if there is an opening 
for an inclusion of begging in the concept of work and in the extension a 
right to education for those children who accompany their parents to another 
member state.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
223 Brito, Oliver, op.cit.  p. 232. 
224 Ibid, p.232. 
225 Ibid. p. 233- 234. 
226 For instance the Swedish Nationalencyklopedin has defined ”begging” as: ”försöka 
beveka någon att lindra ens armod genom att skänka en gåva”. Nationalencyklopedins 
ordbok, språkdata, Göteborg, 1996.  
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4.3.2 Is Begging, Collecting Cans and Sales of 
Street Papers Work within European 
Union Law? 
By applying the circumstances that beggars or persons who are collecting 
cans or selling street papers are operating in, to the concept of worker and 
the conditions that have to be fulfilled, this study will try to determine 
whether it is possible to consider begging, collecting cans or selling street 
papers as work within the context of EU law. Notably is that the situation of 
begging, collecting cans or selling street papers has not been deliberated 
upon by ECJ in relation to the concept of work. This comparison is 
therefore based on possible explanations and arguments that can be put 
forward in order to see if the activities fall within or outside the scope of 
application for the concept of workers within EU law. 
 
The criteria in relation to work described in chapter 2.2.1: 
• the activity must last for a certain period, 227 
• there must be a relationship of subordination, 228 
• the person carrying out the activities must be remunerated and,229 
• there must be real and genuine economic activity230 
 
The criterion that the work should last for a certain period of time and 
should not be marginal or ancillary is, if we apply it to begging, collecting 
cans or selling street papers, most likely fulfilled. The ECJ has concluded 
that even part-time work which is not fully economically substantive in 
order to live is counted as work, as described above.231 The lack of a formal 
employment contract, which is the case for beggars, creates obstacles when 
one labels and categorizes an economic activity in terms of work.   
 
The first work-criterion is closely linked to the third one concerning 
remuneration. The crucial factor is if beggars, collectors or sellers of street 
papers actually can survive and live on the money they get. This is of course 
uncertain since the amount may vary from day to day and it is not 
corresponding to the hours they are active. The ECJ has though been quite 
clear that even though the amount in itself is not sufficient the person can 
have other incomes or someone in the family that they might rely on 
economically. The productivity and the income in itself can not determine 
whether it constitutes work as long as there actually is a remuneration.232  
 
                                                
227 Opinion of the Advocate General Geelhoed in the case C-456/02 Michel Trojani v 
Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) (2004), para. 35. The three conditions are 
laid down in C-66/85 Lawrie-Blum (1986), paragraph 17, C-3444/87 Bettray (1989), 
paragraph 12, and C-337/97 Meeusen (1999), paragraph 13. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid.  
230 Ibid, para. 45. 
231 C-53/81 D.M. Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1982). See reasoning in chapter 4.1. 
232 Ibid. 
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The subordination between an employer and an employee is a criterion that 
has been tackled differently by the ECJ, which implies that it is not a strict 
and formal condition that has to be met. The form of subordination varies 
and no border has explicitly been drawn but the Steymann233 case indicates, 
as discussed in subsection 2.2.1., that flexibility is possible. One can argue 
that there existed a relationship between the person and the religious 
organisation that enabled the commercial activity that engaged the person as 
a worker. For a beggar there is no relationship, except if the activity is 
organized, which sometimes is the case. It is important to differ between 
organized in a non- criminal sense and organized in a criminal sense i.e. 
trafficking. The activity can be organized in the sense that the persons are 
coming together, as families, relatives or friends, to another member state, 
for example Sweden. In the host state they might structure their activity in a 
way that they decide who shall be at a specific place, helping each other 
with claiming places etc. This behaviour is not criminalized, but it can form 
a relationship of subordination. Trafficking on the other side is criminalized, 
since there is a leader who in order to help the persons to transport 
themselves to “good” begging places and countries take an exorbitant price. 
That is certainly a form of subordination, but it is criminalized234 and a 
lawful employment is not possible.235, 236 
 
Is begging, collecting cans or sales of street papers then a real and genuine 
economic activity within the meaning it has in EU law? Once again the lines 
in this case are blurred. From the Bettray237 case, discussed in subsection 
2.2.1., it is noted that rehabilative and reintegration work is not considered 
to be work since it was adopted after the individuals mental and physical 
state. It is also clear that the purpose of the economic activity in the Bettray 
case was rather social in character than that of an economic one. The purely 
economic based purpose of begging, collecting cans or selling street papers 
points in the direction that it can be labelled as work in that sense. However, 
it is far from certain that the criteria outlined above are fulfilled 
simultaneously and there is no clear-cut answer.  
 
The new form of gaining money for vulnerable persons by selling street 
papers, has also been subject to review by domestic courts. What label of 
economic activity that selling street-papers should get is a noteworthy 
aspect of the work-begging relationship. In a case of a Romanian street-
paper seller in Bristol, United Kingdom, the seller wanted housing benefit 
which was dependent on the residence and her status as a worker. The 
question was whether the seller could be classified as a worker. The judge 
                                                
233 C196/87 Udo Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1988). 
234 See for instance: Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings and its Explanatory Report (Warsaw, 16.V.2005) Council of Europe Treaty Series 
No. 197. 
235 Dagens Nyheter, DNs reporter om tiggeriet i Stockholm, http://www.dn.se/sthlm/dns-
reporter-om-tiggeriet-i-stockholm/ published 2014-10-04, accessed:2015-05-11. 
236 European Commission- Migration and Home Affairs: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-human-
beings/index_en.htm accessed 2015-05-18. 
237 C- 344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (1989). 
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concluded that the seller was to be labelled as a self-employed person using 
the ECJ criteria deliberated upon previously stating that: “For someone to 
be regarded as a worker the work must be genuine and effective and not 
marginal or ancillary.  Factors to be taken into account in assessing this 
are the period of employment, the number of hours worked, the level of 
remuneration and whether the work was regular or erratic. The ECJ in Jany 
made it plain that a similar test of genuineness and effectiveness was 
applicable to self-employment.”. 238 What then is the big difference of 
selling a street-paper and begging? The only difference seems to be the 
framing of it in market-based relations that legitimize the street-paper 
vending as work.239 
 
4.3.3 Conclusion on the Right to Education in 
the Roma Context 
The conclusion is that even though an EU-migrant has the aim of seeking a 
job and stays in Sweden with the family and children, EU law in 
combination with the national legislation of Sweden, does not expressly 
guarantee the access to education for this group of children. The parents are 
neither considered workers and entitled to the same social benefits, nor are 
they undocumented migrants or asylum seekers that due to that status are 
enabled to get access to education for their children. 
 
This subchapter has aimed at investigating the specific context in which 
Roma EU-migrants find themselves when coming to Sweden by exercising 
their freedom of movement. They are begging, collecting cans or selling 
street papers with ambitions of getting money to live and support their 
family. They carry out an economic activity that is well known since 
centuries, but not shaped in a formal structure that makes it respected as a 
work. This subchapter has tried to insert a livelihood and a way to support 
oneself in the legal framework of EU. It has provided a practical example of 
how that the right to education for the children is first and foremost 
dependent on the status of the parent and secondly the status of the parent is 
dependent upon which formal requirements that exist for an activity to be 
considered work. These requirements are still attributable to the history of 
the EU as an organization with economic and market based purposes and 
not to an organization with human rights in focus. 
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
If children can not invoke the status of the parent as a worker in order to get 
the right to education, then what is the children left to rely on? As has been 
                                                
238 Bristol City Council v FV [2011] UKUT 494 (AAC) (21 December 2011), para 8. 
239 For a more thorough analysis of street-paper vending see: Cockburn, J.,L. Patrick, Street 
Papers, Work and Begging: “Experimenting” at the Margins of Economic Legitimacy, 
Journal of Cultural Economy 7:2, 2013 p. 145-160. 
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shown in previous chapters, the equal treatment provision in EU law might 
enable the right to education due to its fundamental character. What 
becomes clear when different legal frameworks such as international, 
regional and national legislation of the right to education are coexisting is 
that, if they do not correspond then the individual might be left in a legal 
lacuna. The critical point seems to be that if EU law does not explicitly 
provide for the right to education, but the international conventions do, at 
least in relation to the states which have signed them, which legal 
framework is the one to adhere to in a national context such as the one 
described above?  
 
The purpose of showing a national example is to concretise how EU law and 
the international legislation operate in a national context because it is in 
national contexts that these two supranational frameworks come into play. 
As has been shown the national legislation in Sweden did not provide any 
answer to the question whether EU migrants that are exercising their 
freedom of movement for a maximum of three months enjoy a right to 
education in Sweden. Even though the Swedish law makes reference to EU 
law when it aims at encompass EU-migrating children’s right to education, 
it fails to fill the legal loophole that EU law in itself is upholding by not 
making any explicit reference for this particular group of children. When 
one has to solve a legal dilemma like the one at hand it would be much more 
simple if an existing hierarchy of norms could solve the legal dilemma. 
However, that does not exist when it comes to EU law and international law. 
Much has been written on the interplay between these two frameworks and 
the ECJ has also dealt with it in several cases, but not yet reached a coherent 
approach.240 The next chapter will further engage in an analysis of the 
coexistence of the legal frameworks based on the findings in the study.  
                                                
240 See for instance: C-308/06 Intertanko and Others and Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-
415/05 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation V Council of the 
European Union And Commission of the European Communities 
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5 Analysis 
The previous chapters have engaged in the legal frameworks as well as the 
existing case law that concerns the research question. The aim of this 
chapter is to do an analysis of the outcome of the previous chapters and 
determine how well the different legal frameworks answered to the research 
question. Moreover, an analysis of how the legal uncertainty concerning the 
right to education for EU-migrating children in the host state during an 
initial and temporary period can be solved will be presented, according to 
the author’s view. 
 
The research question is if children who exercise their freedom of 
movement for a maximum of three months enjoy a right to education in the 
host state. The study concerns a specific group (EU-citizens exercising their 
freedom of movement for a maximum of three months) and a specific right 
(the right to education). In order to find a solution to the right to education, 
the study started, in chapter 2, with a review of the legal framework within 
the EU concerning the situation and the particular group of persons 
specified for this study. The answer was that the only way to find an explicit 
right to education in these circumstances was if the child’s parent could be 
classified as a worker. Whether the equal treatment provision enables an 
interpretation that gives an immediate right to education is possible, but not 
explicitly established for this particular group during this period. 
 
Due to the lack of a satisfactory answer on the research question based only 
on EU law, elaborated on in chapter 2, the answer was sought in 
international human rights conventions as well as the EU’s own 
fundamental rights charter, CFR, in chapter 3. The purpose was to see if the 
right to education was made conditional or absolute depending on the 
situation the children were in, i.e. if the right was restricted due to the time-
limit in the host state or, for example, the financial resources of the parents. 
Several international conventions were reviewed and although discrepancies 
do occur between them, the overall impact is that there does exist a right to 
education through the wording of “everyone” or “no person shall be 
denied”. However, some uncertainty is still evident due to the fact that 
international obligations are concluded between, for example the UN and 
the state, and the interplay with EU is not settled in relation to the 
obligations agreed between the member state and an international treaty. 
The fact that the EU legislation enables a new form of “citizenship”, 
creating free movement for persons, also opens up for having persons within 
the state’s territory that not are citizens of the state, but yet stays there 
lawfully and are under the state’s jurisdiction. The question is then if the 
international obligations include this group of EU citizens who stay in the 
host state temporarily as a consequence of EU law? Although the 
international treaties in themselves seem to be more convinced about the 
universal right to education, it is still not evident which one of EU law and 
international law that prevails, or how they interact. 
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The fourth chapter was taking the question further to a national level, in 
order to see if the national context possibly could generate an answer. An 
example of Roma EU-migrating children in Sweden was given in order to 
see how these legal frameworks operate in a national context where the 
additional element of national legislation was added. The example was 
given due to the express concern by the Swedish National Agency for 
Education in regard to the right to education for Roma migrants in Sweden, 
even though the problem concerns all EU-migrants in this particular 
situation. By using the criteria for work, the example of Roma EU-migrants 
that are begging, collecting cans or selling street papers was examined. The 
applicability of the work criteria still left this particular group with no strong 
protection due to the lack of fully convincing arguments that begging 
constitutes an economic activity comparable to work, within the context of 
the ECJ case law. The legal uncertainty for other groups of persons 
exercising their freedom of movement for this limited time, such as self-
employed and job-seekers, was, even though not put in a national context, 
still unclear based on the outcomes of chapter 2 and 3. 
 
The research question was: Do children have a right to education in the host 
state when they exercise their freedom of movement within the European 
Union for a maximum of three months? The next sections will summarize 
what has been deduced as an answer to it. 
 
By analysing EU law it became clear that EU has shared competence to 
regulate the freedom of movement for persons and it has supporting 
competence in matters relating to education. The only express regulation of 
education in situations where freedom of movement is engaged, i.e. where 
these two matters of concern (free movement and education) are triggered 
simultaneously, is in regulation 492/2011 regarding the right to education 
for workers’ children. Since the member states are free to regulate on 
educational matters, the right to education for all other children, who do not 
classify as children to working parents, becomes a matter for the member 
state. 
 
Member states that are bound by international treaties, such as CRC, 
ICESCR and ECHR, have to follow the obligations laid down therein. The 
conclusion is that all persons that are within a member state’s territory or 
jurisdiction are entitled to education due to the lack of express requirement 
of length of stay in a state in order to get access to a right. Conclusively, if a 
state, which is bound by international human rights conventions, does not 
regulate specifically that children who are exercising their freedom of 
movement for a maximum of three months do not enjoy a right to education, 
which would be a breach of international human rights law, there does exist 
a right to education. For those who are children to workers there exists 
automatically a right to education due to the character of the competence the 
EU has in the area of free movement. Since a right to education for worker’s 
children is in conformity with international standards, any conflict or legal 
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lacuna does not exist for this sub-group within the larger group of children 
moving freely within the EU for a maximum of three months. 
 
Since the EU Citizenship Directive should be interpreted in accordance with 
CFR and CFR in its turn should be interpreted in accordance with ECHR it 
turns out that the free movement of persons within the EU and the rights 
they are entitled to are those enshrined in ECHR, regardless of the length of 
stay in the host state. The ECtHR has clearly stated that the right to 
education is fundamental, no exceptions exist and it is a right that can not be 
interpreted strictly. That is a strong argument for regarding the right to have 
an absolute character, where no derogations are acceptable. 
 
The methodology of the ECJ that was described in the chapter 1.2 is also of 
high relevance when a final analysis of the right education in this specific 
context should be presented. The teleological approach certainly can extend 
the scope of a directive to be more in harmony with the aim of the EU itself. 
If the right at stake inhibits in a persons life to the extent that free movement 
is threatened, then the ECJ tends to do a flexible and generous 
interpretation- at least when the person does contribute to the economic 
market. The aim of the EU is not to be a pure human rights organization, but 
by creating the CFR and acknowledge the importance of ECHR, and adhere 
to its reasoning of level of protection, it would be hard to find that the right 
to education is possible to derogate from, regardless of length of stay in the 
host state and the economic status of the parents.  
 
5.1 Future Considerations 
Although there seem to be more convincing arguments for finding a right to 
education for children in the particular situation that this thesis has 
investigated, it is not automatically a clear-cut solution without question 
marks and issues for further discussion. Some of the questions and thoughts 
that the writing of this thesis has given rise to will be deliberated upon 
shortly in the following. 
 
Firstly, the fact that the EU is created as a union with strong similarities 
with a state causes questions of how strong the state sovereignty of the 
national states is. With reduced border control, the state borders are less 
strict and sovereignty does not have the same meaning as it has for other 
states. This creates new rules and legislative measures e.g. questions as 
migration. When a right enshrined in an international convention, such as 
the right to education, is claimed by a EU-citizen it causes concern if the 
person is not a national of the host state. The international treaties, where 
certain rights are laid down, are signed by national states, not by the EU. 
Who are included and can rely on the rights enshrined in an international 
convention? Is it nationals, EU-citizens, or only some EU-citizens? The 
jurisdictionary or territorial clauses included in some of the international 
conventions are probably not adopted after a “state” as the EU, where 
territory and jurisdiction are different from the traditional national 
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perspective. With a more open border control between the EU member 
states the question of the burden of the responsibility to ensure rights for its 
citizens arises. Do states have an extra-territorial obligation to ensure rights 
for those citizens who only temporarily exercise their freedom of movement 
to another member state? Does EU free movement law create a new form of 
responsibility for states regardless of if the persons are staying in the host 
state temporarily or for longer periods fulfilling the criteria for having right 
of residence? These are questions that arise in relation to EU free movement 
and the full enjoyment of human rights, questions that have become evident 
through this study, but remain to be answered within the framework of 
another research question. 
 
Secondly, what has been remarkable throughout this work is that although 
the right to primary education is a topic that through its nature only involves 
children, the main part of EU legalisation that has been reviewed has 
concerned the status of the children’s parents. Children’s express right to 
education is dependent on their parents’ economic status, in order to gain 
access to the right, which implies that children, who are nationals of one EU 
member state, not fully can enjoy their possession of a EU citizenship. The 
notion of the EU citizenship has not been without critique and some of the 
problems were addressed in short in chapter 2.1.2. A more thorough 
analysis of the concept of EU citizenship would be interesting. For example 
if the construction of the EU, based on economic values, entails structures 
that discriminates certain groups such as children and women. That is a 
question that needs to be further explored for a better understanding of what 
can be done in order to be an organization that is based on equal treatment.  
 
Lastly, as was shown by the previous chapter, exemplifying the research 
question in the context on Roma and their access to the right to education, it 
is obvious that it is not only children and women that implicitly, through the 
structure of the EU, become excluded. The EU is initially created after a 
western view on work and economic livelihood. The Roma and their 
livelihood do not fit into the frame set up by the market-based EU creators. 
The concept of work and living is different between cultures and the EU 
seem to, by adopting certain requirements for fulfilling, for example the 
right of residence, preserve values and livelihoods that only are in favour of 
certain cultures whilst others, such as Roma might be excluded. These 
concerns were raised through the process and work of this study. Even 
though some of its aspects were touched upon by the access to education 
during a temporary stay in the host state, there is a lot left to discover which 
most likely does not favour a person with a Roma livelihood and culture. 
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6 Conclusion 
That a right to primary education is one of the most fundamental rights that 
have to be fulfilled for a person to be able to become a citizen with full 
insight and participation in the democratic life is highly uncontested. More 
concern arises in relation to which state that is responsible for respecting, 
protecting and fulfilling this right when it concerns children who not have 
the nationality of the state. As has been shown the right to education for 
migrants might be problematic, but it seems more likely that a right to 
education does exist for this particular group than that it does not. 
 
The legal dilemma arises when an organization of states, such as the EU, 
open up borders which enables a kind of migration that does not fit in the 
ordinary definition of the word. The quasi citizenship that a citizenship of 
the EU implies facilitates movements and residence in a union of states, but 
the rights for the individual and the division of the responsibilities for the 
states is not clear-cut. The aim of this thesis has been to investigate the legal 
frameworks that regulate the situation for children who exercise their 
freedom of movement for a maximum of three months and whether those 
children do enjoy a right to education in the host state. It has clearly been a 
bumpy road and many inconsistencies have occurred. The most striking 
thing is the economic underpinnings of the EU that still influence the access 
and enjoyment of fundamental human rights.  
 
The frameworks for international human rights have been more clear in their 
message, there does exist a right to education for all children within a state’s 
jurisdiction. The greatest concern with a statement like that is that those 
international instruments are created for states, which are able to decide on 
their border control, not for a union of states where the border-control is 
reduced. However, it is hard to neglect the fact that human rights should be 
guaranteed for all within a state’s jurisdiction. The judgements from ECtHR 
indicate that the right to education has a fundamental character that makes it 
almost impossible to derogate from. Due to reference from the EU 
Citizenship Directive, to the EU’s own Charter on Fundamental Rights 
which in its turn refer to ECHR it is more easy and convincing to declare 
that the right to primary education exits to all children who exercise their 
freedom of movement only temporarily, but yet lawfully. That these kinds 
of movements between the states in the EU do not only create opportunities, 
but also new legal dilemmas is this study a proof of. When the border 
control between EU member states diminishes, the legal uncertainties in the 
host states increase for the EU-citizens. That the economic incentives of free 
movement came before the human rights consideration is traceable and 
obvious in the EU legal framework. The quasi EU citizenship that more than 
505 million241 people possess still has a lot to show if equal treatment and 
human rights are values that should be associated with the EU. 
                                                
241  Eurostats statistics explained website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Population_and_population_change_statistics accessed 2015-05-11. 
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103 33 Stockholm 08-405 10 00    
Besöksadress Telefax  
Drottninggatan 16 08-21 68 13  
 
 
 
Hej Hedvig,  
 
tack för ditt brev till Utbildningsdepartementet. Rätten till utbildning 
regleras i skollagen (2010:800). Enligt skollagen har barn som är bosatta i 
Sverige rätt till utbildning. Med bosatt i landet avses i skollagen den som 
ska vara folkbokförd här enligt folkbokföringslagen (1991:481). Dessa 
barn har skolplikt fr.o.m. sju års ålder. Den som har skolplikt har rätt till 
kostnadsfri utbildning.   
 
Det finns också barn som utan att vara folkbokförda i Sverige ska anses 
som bosatta i Sverige vid tillämpningen av skollagen. Dessa barn har inte 
skolplikt, men de har samma rätt till utbildning som skolpliktiga barn. 
Detta gäller t.ex. asylsökande barn och barn som vistas i Sverige utan 
stöd av myndighetsbeslut eller författning, så kallade papperslösa barn. 
För dessa barn är det frivilligt att utnyttja rätten till utbildning. Sådana 
barn har även rätt till utbildning inom gymnasieskolan eller 
gymnasiesärskolan, men för det krävs i vissa fall att de påbörjar sina 
studier där före 18 års ålder. 
 
De barn som är medborgare i andra EU-länder och vistas i Sverige med 
stöd av rätten att vistas i ett annat EU-land i högst tre månader saknar 
rätt till utbildning enligt skollagen.  
 
Kommuner kan ansöka om statsbidrag för utbildningskostnader för 
asylsökande barn och barn som vistas i landet utan tillstånd. 
 
 
Med vänlig hälsning 
 
 
 
Åsa Källén 
  
  
  
2015-02-04 U2015/238/S 
  
Utbildningsdepartementet 
 
Skolenheten 
Åsa Källén 
 
Hedvig Areskoug 
hedvig.areskoug@gmail.com 
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Från:        Hedvig Areskoug <hedvig.areskoug@gmail.com>  
Till:        sofia.kalin@skolverket.se  
Datum:        2015-01-15 11:41  
Ärende:        Fråga inför examensarbete kring EU-migranters rätt till 
skolgång  
 
 
Hej Sofia, 
 
Jag är juriststudent på Lunds universitet (International Human Rights Law) 
och ska till våren skriva mitt examensarbete som ska behandla EU-
migranters rätt till utbildning i Sverige. Fokus i uppsatsen kommer att vara 
på de EU-migranter som åker fram och tillbaka mellan sitt hemland och 
Sverige och därmed stannar relativt korta perioder i Sverige. Jag läste på 
Sveriges Radio att du var intervjuad (det var även så jag fick nys om 
uppsatsämnet) i oktober förra året i frågan 
(http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=1646&artikel=5996013
). 
 
I uppsatsen tänker jag redogöra för hur såväl nationell som EU-rätt 
samspelar med internationella konventioner. Främst kommer uppsatsen 
beröra den fria rörligheten för personer i relation till rätten till utbildning. I 
SR:s artikel så uppges rätten till utbildning för EU-migranter som kommer 
till Sverige under dessa förutsättningar (att tigga) vara oreglerat. Vad jag 
undrar är hur Skolverket resonerat i denna fråga för att nå slutsatsen att 
området är oreglerat? Är det i relation till de barn som stannar i Sverige 
kortare tid än tre månader som de "faller utanför systemet" eller är det för 
att, om de stannar mer än tre månader, inte har föräldrar som kan räknas 
som arbetstagare i dess EU-rättsliga mening som barnen således blir utan 
utbildning (för att de inte heller anses vara papperslösa efter tre månader)? 
 
Såvitt jag har förstått så finns det i EU-rätten relativt omfattande skydd just 
för barn som migrerar och deras rätt till skolgång, oavsett föräldrarnas legala 
status i landet. Därför vore det mycket intressant och givande om du har 
möjlighet att utveckla hur du och Skolverket ser på den här situationen. 
 
Jag är väldigt tacksam om du finner tid att svara på mitt mejl, men förstår 
såklart om du har mycket annat att göra! 
 
Mvh, 
 
Hedvig Areskoug 
 
 
 
 71 
Från: sofia.kalin@skolverket.se 
Till: Hedvig Areskoug <hedvig.areskoug@gmail.com> 
Ang. Fråga inför examensarbete kring EU-migranters rätt till skolgång 
 
Hej Hedvig,  
 
För vissa kategorier av EU-medborgare står det klart att det finns en rätt till 
utbildning i andra medlemsstater, t.ex. för arbetstagare och deras barn. 
Deras rätt är reglerad i bl.a. förordning 492/2011 om arbetskraftens fria 
rörlighet inom unionen och i rättsfall från EU-domstolen. För EU-
medborgare som vistas i andra medlemsstater enbart med stöd av den s.k. 
tremånadersregeln i artikel 6 i rörlighetsdirektivet (2004/38/EG) har vi dock 
inte kunnat finna rättsligt stöd för att en rätt till utbildning finns.  
 
Om en EU-medborgare stannar kvar i Sverige i längre tid än tre månader 
utan att få någon annan form av uppehållsrätt eller uppehållstillstånd så 
vistas han eller hon här utan stöd av myndighetsbeslut eller författning och 
är med andra ord papperslös. För barn i denna situation finns rätt till 
utbildning i 29 kap. 2 § 2 stycket 5 skollagen (2010:800).  
 
Jag hoppas att jag tolkat dina frågor rätt. Lycka till med ditt examensarbete!  
 
Med vänlig hälsning  
 
Sofia Kalin  
jurist  
08-527 336 15  
Skolverket, Rättssekretariatet  
106 20 Stockholm  
sofia.kalin@skolverket.se  
www.skolverket.se  
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